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A NEW BALANCE: WEIGHING HARMS OF 
HIDING POLICE MISCONDUCT INFORMATION 
FROM THE PUBLIC 
Cynthia H. Conti-Cook† 
ABSTRACT 
Three New York City events in the past two years have demonstrated 
how hiding information related to police misconduct harms its residents. 
In April 2016, the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) eliminated 
public access to misconduct information by taking down a clipboard in 
the Deputy Commissioner of Public Information’s office that posted dis-
ciplinary summaries and removing decades worth of archives of those 
same summaries from City Hall. In September 2017, an Administrative 
Law Judge employed by the NYPD closed from the public a courtroom 
where a former officer was about to be impeached with his prior discipli-
nary record. In April 2018, four plainclothes police officers shot Mr. Sa-
heed Vassell dead in broad daylight. The Mayor and Police Commissioner 
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never named these officers, while the NYPD aggressively sought to ma-
nipulate public opinion towards a conclusion that the officers’ shooting 
was justified and more generally that NYPD officers are restrained in us-
ing violence against unarmed civilians. 
This article argues that police privacy protections enacted in state 
statutes across the country cause greater harm to individuals, public trust 
in justice systems, and democratic decision-making than access to police 
misconduct information harms individual police officers. People harmed 
by hiding police officer misconduct include families who lost loved ones 
to police violence, communities uncertain if dangerous officers are still a 
threat, and everyone who witnesses how impossible it seems to hold of-
ficers accountable. These harms spread across cities and states and are 
passed down through generations. 
Previously prioritized police privacy concerns will be examined 
closely and weighed carefully in relation to the actual harms they can 
cause. A new balance will conclude that the harms caused by police pri-
vacy protections to the public significantly outweigh transparency’s po-
tential harm to police officers’ privacy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Not everything that is faced can be changed; but nothing can be 
changed until it is faced.”-  James Baldwin1 
This Article was written from the “blackout” of police misconduct 
information in New York City.2 The state of police misconduct in late 
2018 has been fueled by the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) 
broad interpretation of Civil Rights Law section 50-a and was recently 
adopted by a majority of New York’s highest court.3 In the past two years, 
the City of New York removed decades of police disciplinary information 
from publicly accessible City Hall archives,4 closed a public courtroom 
to mask a former officer’s police disciplinary record,5 and allowed offic-
ers who killed Saheed Vassell in broad daylight to remain nameless and 
faceless.6 These decisions have been justified by strict allegiance to New 
York State’s Civil Rights Law section 50-a, a law built on police claims 
to privacy. The City’s fidelity to 50-a—despite the harm that hiding police 
information does to all New Yorkers, especially families and communi-
ties of people directly harmed by police violence—is a result of its own 
failure to weigh these harms against claims of police privacy rights. This 
article discusses the harms of hiding police misconduct information, in 
the events above, in reverse chronological order, starting with the recent 
2018 police killing of Saheed Vassell. The purpose of balancing the harms 
to the community from secrecy against harms to police from publicity is 
to facilitate comparisons between these competing tensions. Rather than 
 
 1 James Baldwin, As Much Truth as One Can Bear, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Jan. 14, 
1962, at 38. 
 2 Daily News Editorial Board, NYPD in View: Police Records Must Be Made Public, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 17, 2018, 4:10 AM), https://perma.cc/AC4V-E5LS. 
 3 Id.; see NYCLU v. NYPD, No. 133, 2018 WL 6492733 (N.Y. Dec. 11, 2018). 
 4 Verified Answer, Luongo v. Records Access Officer at 3, No. 6316 160232/2016 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Mar. 15, 2017) (admitting history of public availability at NYPD headquarters and 
City Hall library); Luongo v. Records Access Appeals Officer, 2019 WL 237463 (N.Y. App. 
Div. Jan. 17, 2019) (affirming denial of author’s demand for release of records). See Kendall 
Taggart, et al., Here are the Records on Thousands of New York Police Misconduct Cases, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/7S6W-H37U, for a set of these records that 
has since been published. These were not the original records of discipline for individual of-
ficers but summaries of police discipline distributed quarterly, including a summary of the 
facts, outcome, and penalty. 
 5 See Ashley Southall, At James Blake Trial, Judge Invokes Law Shielding Police Rec-
ords, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/8NKZ-BZPR. 
 6 See Rocco Parascandola & Thomas Tracy, Cops Who Killed Saheed Vassell Identified, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 27, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://perma.cc/BDA4-4RY6. The NYPD also 
refused to name the officers involved in forcibly removing a baby from a mother’s arms and 
accusing her of criminal conduct as she waited to be seen at a food assistance center. Jake 
Offenhartz, ‘Appalling’ Video Shows NYPD Officers Ripping Infant from Brooklyn Mother’s 
Arms, GOTHAMIST (Dec. 10, 2018, 8:52 AM), https://perma.cc/TBK9-4B5V. 
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speaking about more esoteric benefits of transparency, this article ex-
plores how secrecy harms the public.7 Through this reframing of what 
society sacrifices in favor of police privacy, a stronger policy argument 
for making police misconduct information public can develop. 
Part I first reflects on how the recent decisions to hide police mis-
conduct information have traumatized families and communities. It next 
examines, using rationale derived from First Amendment right of access 
cases, how hiding misconduct information, administrative decisions, and 
data undermines the public’s and the police officers’ trust in the police 
disciplinary system and legal system generally. Part I ends with a discus-
sion about how hiding police disciplinary information hinders public dis-
course around questions of police discipline and accountability, both cur-
rently and historically. Similar to the analysis done in cases finding a right 
of access, Part I walks through the many ways that more information, not 
less, serves the public interest. 
It is worth pausing here to define who “the public,” referred to in this 
section, includes: people harmed or killed by police, their family mem-
bers, all of the people they know, protesters, police reform advocates, in-
vestigative reporters, people accused of crimes by police, people who vote 
and people who don’t vote, parents who counsel their children about po-
lice encounters, jurors, laundromat gossips, teachers, bartenders, students, 
historians, plumbers, radio show hosts, everyone who consumes infor-
mation and everyone who doesn’t consume information, and everyone 
who discusses politics at the water cooler, at the barbershop, or on Face-
book, regardless of their level of education. As members of the “public,” 
we all share various capacities for and commitments to discerning the 
meaning of information, pursuing reports that put events in context, and 
educating ourselves about how we can change the world we live in. But 
we cannot change anything without first facing it. 
One place facing police accountability reform is Chicago, where 
thirty years of police civilian complaint records were recently made pub-
lic in a visually stunning database.8 Chicago stands in stark contrast to 
New York City and will be discussed throughout as a rare example of how 
transparency of police disciplinary records actually, not hypothetically, 
benefits society. Despite Chicago’s many mentions, this article has an un-
mistakable New York City bias. Some conclusions made in this article 
may not be applicable to other jurisdictions because their local laws are 
 
 7 Cf. Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (articulat-
ing the balancing as the benefits of transparency in improving police accountability weighed 
against police privacy harms). 
 8 See Citizens Police Data Project, http://perma.cc/32DT-RQRK (last visited Dec. 11, 
2018). 
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different. For example, the NYPD disciplinary trials are open to the public 
under local law,9 yet the written decisions resulting from the proceedings 
are not.10 
The disciplinary charges discussed below are also informed by New 
York City norms. These norms can include everything from use of on-
duty excessive force to administrative violations related to sick days and 
to off-duty misconduct. Because these records are not public, it is unclear 
to advocates, the public, and even to elected officials what proportion of 
misconduct directly impacts New Yorkers. There is no exhaustive list of 
potential charges that an officer might face.11 For the purposes of this ar-
ticle, police misconduct information generally refers to information about 
on-duty misconduct related to encounters with the public and policing 
powers, and the resulting outcome of that discipline. As the section on 
public discourse explores in depth, limiting what categories of police mis-
conduct the public has an interest in before allowing access to the spec-
trum of misconduct is premature; the public cannot make informed deci-
sions without full access. 
A final term to clarify for the discussion in Part I is what this article 
means when it refers to information. “Information” encompasses specific 
intake reports, interview reports, exhibits, video, body worn camera foot-
age, charges, court transcripts, written summations, reports and recom-
mendations, final penalties, and disciplinary summaries, unless specified 
otherwise. Some types of information may be more digestible for the pub-
lic than others, separate from the question of what privacy claims police 
have in it. 
Part II reviews how police officers’ attempts to find constitutional 
and other legal protections for their misconduct information historically 
failed with respect to on-duty misconduct. In light of these failures, some 
police unions have successfully lobbied for powerful privacy protections, 
such as New York State’s Civil Rights Law section 50-a, through well-
funded political campaigns that intentionally prioritize police officers’ 
 
 9 38 R.C.N.Y. 15-04(g) (2018); Doe v. City of Schenectady, 84 A.D.3d 1455, 1456 (3d 
Dep’t 2011). 
 10 NYCLU v. NYPD, No. 133, 2018 WL 6492733 (N.Y. Dec. 11, 2018). 
 11 See NYPD, PATROL GUIDE PROCEDURE NO. 206-03: VIOLATIONS SUBJECT TO 
COMMAND DISCIPLINE (2017), https://perma.cc/L8DN-RT37, providing that discipline may be 
imposed based on charges brought under Schedule A, “[a]ny other minor violation that, in the 
opinion of the commanding/executive officer is appropriate for Schedule A command disci-
pline procedure;” under Schedule B, “[a]ny other violation, which, in the opinion of the com-
manding/executive officer and after notification to the patrol borough adjutant and consulta-
tion with the Department Advocate, is appropriate for Schedule ‘B’ command discipline 
procedure;” under Schedule C, “[a]ny violation reviewed and determined by the Department 
Advocate to be suitable for Schedule ‘C’ command discipline.” 
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privacy claims above the public harms discussed in Part I. Part II scruti-
nizes police representatives’ claims that have justified these broad protec-
tions and discerns, more narrowly, which police officers’ concerns about 
publicity actually justify regulating public disclosure of police miscon-
duct information. 
Like the description of the public above, who is speaking for the po-
lice should also be addressed. The claims described in Part II are largely 
made by police unions and their spokespeople or other representatives of 
law enforcement. Police officers are not monolithic thinkers and may hold 
a variety of opinions about what misconduct information should and 
should not be publicly available. This author does not assign to all police 
officers the unreasonable position that all misconduct information should 
be withheld. These more bloated claims of danger to public safety and 
lost confidence in police authority are dissected in Part II, and their ra-
tionale is probed for whether such concerns weigh in favor of opacity ver-
sus transparency. 
To conclude, a leaner definition of police privacy harm derived from 
Part II is measured against a new articulation of harms from Part I. Instead 
of weighing amorphous and academic concepts of transparency and pri-
vacy, this new balance of harms grounds the debate over police miscon-
duct information. When properly balanced, police claims of privacy con-
cerns render the need for more, not less, informed public discussion and 
greater access to misconduct information. 
PART I: THE HARMS OF HIDING POLICE DISCIPLINARY RECORDS 
This Part discusses the harm of hiding police disciplinary records: 
harm to individuals, to public trust in police accountability and public jus-
tice systems, and to public discourse. Like the analysis courts apply in 
determining whether someone has a First Amendment right of access to 
courtrooms, court records, transcripts, or filings, the analysis here consid-
ers the history of a public expectation of publicity versus privacy in police 
misconduct information. 
A. Hiding Police Misconduct Information Amplifies Trauma 
Police have incredible power to use physical force that, without a 
badge, would otherwise be considered violence. They have power to in-
terfere with someone navigating their day and, on their word alone, haul 
them out of their life and into a police car. This power requires responsi-
bility and mechanisms for accountability because if abused, it can result 
in lifelong trauma and alienation for the public they are sworn to protect. 
Courts have recognized that transparency can have a “community thera-
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peutic value”12 that provides an “outlet[] for ‘community concern, hostil-
ity, and emotions.’”13 Transparency facilitates healing. Without transpar-
ency, fear of future harm continues, officers are able to exploit the power 
of reliable anonymity, and lack of information further deprives family and 
community members of informed decision-making when considering 
whether to pursue justice through a civil lawsuit, a civilian complaint, po-
litical campaigns, media campaigns, or criminal prosecution. 
A tragic example of this occurred earlier last year. Mr. Saheed 
Vassell was a 34-year-old man loved by his family and community before 
he was shot dead by New York City Police Department officers Leon 
Dinham, Anthony Bottiglieri, Bekim Molic, and Omar Rafiq on the after-
noon of April 4, 2018.14 These officers were never arrested or charged 
with any crime.15 Whether they are even under investigation by the NYPD 
is unknown. Their prior histories of civilian complaints also remain un-
known. What the NYPD was quick to release, however, was Mr. Vassell’s 
sealed arrest records and mental health history.16 This smear campaign 
was not unique to Mr. Vassell’s death. Following any violent encounter, 
the power of releasing a person’s history of violence is indisputable. The 
police know this; they often unlawfully and recklessly release the sealed 
arrest history of people police have killed.17 In addition to leaking Mr. 
 
 12 David S. Ardia, Court Transparency and the First Amendment, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 
835, 895 (2017) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570-71 
(1980) (plurality opinion)). 
 13 Id. at 868 (quoting Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 704 (6th Cir. 2002)). 
 14 We only learned the names of these officers through a leak to the press. Their names 
have not been confirmed by the NYPD. See Parascandola & Tracy, Cops Who Killed Saheed 
Vassell Identified, supra note 6. 
 15 See id. 
 16 See Tina Moore & Bruce Golding, Man Killed by NYPD Had Bizarre Run-in with Cops 
in 2008, N.Y. POST (Apr. 5, 2018 10:40 PM), https://perma.cc/94PV-M973. 
 17 Closed arrest records are not publicly available in New York State. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 
§§ 160.50(1)(c), 160.55(1)(c) (McKinney 2018). Experience has shown that, to the extent the 
media reports on closed arrest records of someone killed by police, it is most likely due to an 
unlawful leak from NYPD. There are many examples of articles exposing the leaked arrest 
history of someone killed by police. See, e.g., Michael Tomasky, Rudy’s Rap Sheet, N.Y. MAG 
(Apr. 24, 2000), https://perma.cc/6GQH-PR6V (reporting that then-Police Commissioner 
Howard Safir argued that the NYPD could leak arrest records after someone dies, and detailing 
two instances where sealed arrest records of men who survived police encounters were re-
leased by police sources); Rebecca Davis O’Brien et al., New York City Police Officer Won’t 
Face Criminal Charges in Eric Garner Death, WALL ST. J., https://perma.cc/H9EG-J3Y3 (last 
updated Dec. 4, 2014, 1:15 AM) (reporting Eric Garner’s arrest record and including infor-
mation from “[a]n official” that the charges included the sale of unlicensed cigarettes); Sources 
to CBS2: Officer Accidentally Shot Unarmed Man While Opening Door With Gun in Hand, 
CBS N.Y. (Nov. 21, 2014, 11:04 PM), http://perma.cc/9ZTE-CUC2 (“Gurley ha[d] 24 prior 
arrests on his record, police said.”); Robert Lewis, The Double Standard of NYPD Leaks, 
WNYC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/4UJU-2P5Y (discussing how the NYPD 
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Vassell’s arrest history and disparaging his character, the NYPD monop-
olized surveillance footage to distort his actions immediately preceding 
the shooting. Detectives collected hard drives from local businesses18 and 
“released snippets of different surveillance videos that showed Vassell 
pointing a piece of soldering torch—which looked like a gun—at several 
pedestrians.”19 The police communications strategy to paint a false narra-
tive that Mr. Vassell posed an imminent threat to the officers retrauma-
tized Mr. Vassell’s family and community.20 Through their grief for their 
loss, Mr. Vassell’s family struggled to counter the narrative around what 
happened while also recovering the character of their father, son, and 
brother.21 
 
leaked sealed arrest records of Ramarley Graham); Eric Lipton, Giuliani Cites Criminal Past 
of Slain Man, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2000), https://perma.cc/8UC3-5EL4 (“[M]ayor [Giuli-
ani] . . . confirmed that he had authorized the release of Mr. Dorismond’s arrest record imme-
diately after the shooting, citing the public’s ‘right to know.’”). 
 18 Local business owners have described NYPD detectives coming to their businesses, 
removing the hard drives from their surveillance equipment, and changing the content to fit 
their narrative. Interview with Victor Dempsey, Families United for Justice Regional Repre-
sentative for the Tri-State Area and Community Justice Unit Organizer, The Legal Aid Soci-
ety, in New York, NY (Oct. 30, 2018). Dempsey is an author and a community activist who 
investigated the killing of Saheed Vassell in its aftermath. His brother Delrawn Smalls was 
killed by off-duty Officer Wayne Isaacs. 
 19 Parascandola & Tracy, Cops Who Killed Saheed Vassell Identified, supra note 6. 
 20 See Eric Vassell, I Demand Justice for Saheed: Vassell’s Father Says the NYPD is 
Protecting the Officers Responsible for His Son’s Death, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 7, 2018, 
5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/Q9F6-ZUAC; see also Janet Burns, After NYPD Slaying, Neigh-
bors Honor #TheRealSaheed as City Remains Silent, FORBES (May 21, 2018, 12:57 PM), 
https://perma.cc/RQ6W-LD5D (describing how the community countered the NYPD’s por-
trayal of Mr. Vassell through recorded interviews and published on social media under 
#TheRealSaheed, recalling how Mr. Vassell was known to help people with groceries and 
laundry, and walk neighbors to the subway late at night). For a perspective typically excluded 
from mainstream media, see Victor Dempsey & Nissa Tzun, The Shooting of “Sy,” FORCED 
TRAJECTORY PROJECT (Apr. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/B4RY-NUSA (discussing the differ-
ences between the NYPD’s narrative and what the witnesses observed). 
 21 See Jillian Jorgensen, Family, Advocates Demand City Release Names of Cops Who 
Shot Saheed Vassell, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 21, 2018, 6:40 PM), https://perma.cc/24ER-
KC85 (“His father insisted the video that has been released of the April 4 incident does not 
show Vassell pointing the object at police. Several clips do show him pointing it at a passerby. 
Video of his interactions with cops is taken from further away.”); see also Stephon Johnson, 
Names of Officers Who Killed Saheed Vassell Leaked, Father and Community Call out NYPD, 
N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS (Aug. 2, 2018, 11:18 AM), https://perma.cc/9XJR-VR95 (“Vassell’s 
family said members of the 71st Precinct knew of Vassell’s mental illness and knew he wasn’t 
a public danger. The police have released snippets of surveillance videos of the incident, but 
the family wants a full, unedited video released.”). 
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As the police push their narrative of events, they almost never reveal 
an officer’s history of violence.22 Mr. Vassell’s family repeatedly de-
manded information about the officers who shot their loved one, asking 
for the officers’ names and disciplinary records.23 Such information could 
have given the shooting context, such as whether the officers had previ-
ously escalated street encounters, abused people in psychiatric crisis, used 
excessive force, or submitted false statements to supervisors. This is the 
type of information that could inform the family’s decision about how to 
proceed. The Vassell family wanted information that may have given 
them, and the community, a sense of safety and a path towards healing by 
feeling assured the police department was preventing future violence by 
investigating, charging, or disciplining the officers. Mr. Vassell’s com-
munity, not knowing whether the officers who killed Mr. Vassell were 
still patrolling their neighborhood in plainclothes, also struggled with 
trauma: “There’s pain in our community that’s being ignored . . . . When 
we talk about police abuse of force and power, we’re forgetting that there 
are primary and secondary traumas that stay with these communities.”24 
Yet, in the weeks after Saheed’s killing, the Vassell family and their com-
munity were left in the dark without a name or face of a single officer who 
shot Saheed, trying to decide what to do next. It was only because of a 
leak to the media four months later that they learned who the officers 
were,25 and that none of them even had their firearms removed.26 
 
 22 See infra Section I.C. An important exception to this was in Chicago, where the Citi-
zens Police Data Project made several years of police complaint data public. See Citizens Po-
lice Data Project, supra note 8. When the video of Laquan McDonald’s shooting was released, 
the public had simultaneous access to Van Dyke’s complaint history, which revealed a long 
history of complaints of brutality. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, Chicago Officer Had History of 
Complaints Before Laquan McDonald Shooting, CNN, https://perma.cc/SPK2-PTQ3 (last up-
dated Nov. 26, 2015, 5:45 PM). 
 23 Jim O’Grady, Why We’re Not Supposed to Know the Names of Cops who Kill Civilians, 
but Sometimes Do, WNYC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/ABJ5-DHGK; Vassell, 
supra note 20 (“We deserve real accountability from the NYPD and full disclosure of what 
really happened. Instead, it was only through media leaks in late July that we learned about 
four police officers responsible for my son’s death. And even after those leaks, the NYPD has 
not formally confirmed the names of the officers, or provided details about which officer shot 
first or last, or most.”). 
 24 Burns, supra note 20 (quoting Anthonine Pierre, Deputy Director of the Brooklyn 
Movement Center). 
 25 Parascandola & Tracy, Cops Who Killed Saheed Vassell Identified, supra note 6. None 
of the leaked information was officially confirmed by NYPD or the City of New York. Vassell, 
supra note 20. 
 26 Parascandola & Tracy, Cops Who Killed Saheed Vassell Identified, supra note 6 
(“None of them has been put on modified assignment as the department investigates the fatal 
shooting of Vassell on April 4.”). A modified assignment means the removal of the officers’ 
firearms, shield, ID card, and other Department property, and the officers do not perform reg-
ular tours. NYPD, PATROL GUIDE PROCEDURE NO. 206-10: MODIFIED ASSIGNMENT 1 (2016). 
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The struggle against asymmetrical access to information is not 
unique to those impacted by Saheed Vassell’s death. Constance Malcolm, 
Ramarley Graham’s mother, had to bring a lawsuit to gain access to in-
ternal NYPD records related to the investigation and prosecution of her 
son’s death.27 The police officer who shot Ramarley was not successfully 
indicted in state criminal court, was never charged with federal civil rights 
crimes, and was allowed to quietly resign.28 Gwen Carr, Eric Garner’s 
mother, has fought for the NYPD to fire Officer Daniel Pantaleo and the 
other officers involved for illegally using a chokehold and killing her 
son.29 She, along with Ms. Malcolm and other family members, led New 
Yorkers in marches and rallies and wrote op-eds calling for more respon-
sive action from NYPD,30 but was told the NYPD was waiting for the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) to act, only to be told four years later the 
NYPD would go ahead without DOJ action.31 
 
 27 See Graham Rayman, Judge Orders City to Turn over Internal NYPD Records in 
Ramarley Graham Case, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/VG2T-
33CZ (“It’s outrageous, but under de Blasio’s NYPD, it’s not surprising that I had to sue to 
get information related to the murder of my son and that they’ve fought the release of these 
files for so long. I am glad Judge Mendez has ruled in my favor and that he saw through the 
NYPD’s lies.”) (quoting Constance Malcolm). 
 28 See Matthew Haag & Ashley Southall, Officer Who Killed Ramarley Graham Leaves 
New York Police Department, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/YMS2-RSQU. 
This is not uncommon; police who kill people on-duty often evade criminal accountability in 
a courtroom. Madison Park, Police Shootings: Trials, Convictions are Rare for Officers, CNN, 
https://perma.cc/DN8S-GXNN (last updated Oct. 3, 2018, 4:41 PM) (providing examples of 
high-profile police killings across the country that did not result in charges or convictions 
against the officers including Lamar Anthony Smith in 2011, Sylville Smith in 2016, Philando 
Castile in 2016, Terrance Crutcher in 2016, Freddie Gray in 2015, Samuel DuBose in 2015, 
Eric Garner in 2014, Michael Brown in 2014, Tamir Rice in 2014, Sandra Bland in July 2015, 
Alton Sterling in 2016). 
 29 Thomas Tracy, Mother of Eric Garner Demands NYPD Fire Cop Who Used Banned 
Chokehold that Led to His Death as Disciplinary Trial Nears, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 20, 
2018, 12:55 PM), https://perma.cc/G2QU-SHMB (“The NYPD should fire Pantaleo and all of 
the other officers who were responsible for misconduct related to my son’s murder . . . . In 
order for this to happen, Mayor de Blasio must release all of their names and ensure that the 
NYPD bring charges against the other officers who engaged in misconduct.”) (quoting Gwen 
Carr); Gwen Carr, Four Years Ago the NYPD Killed my Son. I’m Still Waiting for Justice., 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 12, 2018, 4:42 PM), https://perma.cc/C9YR-ULQ3. 
 30 Gwen Carr & Constance Malcolm, Cuomo’s Unkept Justice Promise, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (July 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/LYT2-JE5Y (op-ed); Vincent Barone, Peaceful Rally, 
March for Eric Garner Finishes Up Outside 120th Precinct Stationhouse, STATEN ISLAND 
ADVANCE, https://perma.cc/7UVD-4X56 (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (leading march with fam-
ily and Al Sharpton); Aaron Morrison, After Her NYPD Arrest, Eric Garner’s Mother Gwen 
Carr Says It’s Her Duty to Fight Trump, MIC (Feb. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/Z4BV-KQZF 
(describing Gwen Carr’s participation in civil disobedience to “fight for [her] son” against 
Trump and all politicians). 
 31 See Benjamin Weiser & J. David Goodman, Police Dept. Gives Federal Investigators 
Ultimatum in Eric Garner Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/VN5K-TGPV. 
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The deflections, delays, and denials of responsibility for police vio-
lence cause more unrest and distrust. Similarly, public perceptions of gov-
ernmental abuse of power cause widespread harm to a community and a 
family reeling from the death of a loved one.32 As the Vassells said in a 
statement to the press, “[t]hese are not the actions of a city government 
committed to the truth – instead it seems like public officials and the 
NYPD trying to hide something.”33 Similarly, Gwen Carr, the mother of 
Eric Garner, and Constance Malcolm, the mother of Ramarley Graham, 
jointly wrote that the failures of the legal system “to hold officers account-
able exacerbated [the] pain and suffering [of burying their children].”34 
Families and communities rightfully fear that anonymity empowers offic-
ers to act with impunity. Trauma takes long to heal and spreads quickly 
across neighborhoods, cities, states, countries, and lasts generations. 
Family members of those killed by police experience the effects of 
that trauma first hand. Ramarley Graham’s brother saw his unarmed big 
brother get chased inside of his home by a police officer who then shot 
him in the bathroom.35 Eric Garner’s daughter, Erica Garner, died of a 
heart attack at 27-years-old fighting for justice for her father.36 The month 
before her death, on the third anniversary of the Staten Island Grand 
Jury’s failure to return an indictment of the man who killed her father, 
Erica said in an interview, “I’m struggling right now with the stress and 
everything . . . . The system beats you down to where you can’t win.”37 
 
 32 The effects of abuse of power by the government parallel the City’s use of stop-and-
frisk tactics. See Andy Cush, The Harrowing Psychological Side Effects of Stop-and-Frisk, 
GAWKER (Oct. 17, 2014, 9:36 AM), https://perma.cc/V6QH-U8HA (“The analysis found anx-
iety symptoms were related to the number of times men were stopped and how they perceived 
the encounter, and [it found] more anxiety among participants who have had more intrusive 
encounters.”); see also Jesse Singal, What Are the Psychological Effects of Stop-and-Frisk?, 
CUT (Sept. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/6RQW-T43A (“[Stop-and-frisk] affected how people 
lived their lives, the extent to which they felt comfortable simply hanging out in their own 
neighborhoods, and — perhaps most important, from a policy perspective — their trust in and 
willingness to help the police.”). 
 33 Ciara McCarthy, Saheed Vassell’s Family Demand Answers After Police Shooting, 
PROSPECT HEIGHTS PATCH (May 2, 2018, 5:58 PM), https://perma.cc/WZ3R-RJ8N (quoting 
Lorna and Eric Vassell, Saheed Vassell’s parents). 
 34 Carr & Malcolm, supra note 30. 
 35 Police Shoot and Kill 18-Year-Old Inside Bathroom of Bronx Home, CBS N.Y. (Feb. 
2, 2012, 9:52 PM), https://perma.cc/3VDT-PXVS (“In the bathroom they shot [Ramarley]. 
My 6-year-old son was there and saw everything . . . .”) (quoting Constance Malcolm, Ramar-
ley Graham’s mother). 
 36 Vivian Wang, Erica Garner, Activist and Daughter of Eric Garner, Dies at 27, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/8V3Z-JXTW. 
 37 Benjamin Dixon (@BenjaminPDixon), TWITTER (Dec. 28, 2017, 9:44 AM), 
https://twitter.com/BenjaminPDixon/status/946436687588192257 [http://perma.cc/C3P2-P6
MS] (video interview with Erica Garner). 
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Saheed Vassell’s 4-year-old niece asks how long her uncle will be dead, 
and his teenage son lost his father.38 
Family members grieve their families’ deaths and fight for their 
loved one’s humanity in the face of the stories told by police to justify or 
mitigate the wrongful death. They fight through the fear of knowing that 
some officers will correctly assume that their violence will remain anon-
ymous—a power historically and currently used to specifically terrorize 
people of color.39 Many people avoid calling the police, even when in 
danger, wanting to avoid future encounters, especially after high-profile 
police violence.40 This fear of an official yet faceless threat—and the re-
sultant refusal of communities to engage with the police—causes broader 
harm to the legitimacy of police disciplinary systems, police authority, 
and the criminal legal system in general. 
Harm is also caused by not allowing family members full decision-
making power in the weeks following their loved one’s death. People feel 
differently when an officer may have made a mistake one time or had one 
bad day as opposed to an officer who routinely abused their authority. In 
the author’s seven years in private civil rights practice, she heard people 
express a desire to prevent future harm from officers repeatedly escalating 
violence in their community more frequently than they expressed a desire 
for money. Yet many people do not engage with the governmental over-
sight systems because they cannot learn what penalty, if any, an officer 
receives.41 This creates a system where people are more likely to sue for 
costly money damages rather than pursue administrative remedies that 
could actually penalize officers or result in positive reforms.42 
 
 38 Van Tieu, Father Slams NYPD Narrative After Police Fatally Shoot Man, SPECTRUM 
NEWS (Apr. 4, 2018, 10:38 PM), https://perma.cc/D39W-46NZ. 
 39 See Corinne Segal, White Supremacists Once Wore Hoods. Now, an Internet Mob 
Won’t Let Them Stay Anonymous, PBS (Aug. 20, 2017, 6:18 PM), https://perma.cc/9XP9-
XAMX (discussing the power of anonymity in the growth and preservation of white suprem-
acy, from early use of physical masks, costumes, makeup and even accents to disguise identity, 
to more recent proliferation of online forums and how anonymity strengthens group norms). 
 40 Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, Police Brutality Leads to Thousands Fewer Calls to 911, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 28, 2016), https://perma.cc/4HD9-DDCP (covering the research of sociolo-
gists who studied significant drops in 911 calls following high-profile incidents of police bru-
tality). 
 41 For an example of the NYPD’s refusal to disclose officer penalties, see Laura Dimon 
& Graham Rayman, Exclusive: Cop Who Tackled Tennis Star James Blake Hit with Five-Day 
Penalty, Half What Board Recommended, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 8, 2016, 4:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/96VV-YACX (“The NYPD did not disclose the decision in the excessive 
force case publicly because of a policy to withhold disciplinary outcomes, citing Section 50-
a of the state Civil Rights Law.”). 
 42 See Daniel Moritz-Rabson, NYPD Abuse: City Paid $384 Million to Settle Lawsuits, 
NEWSWEEK (Sept. 4, 2018, 2:01 PM), https://perma.cc/PG36-ZBPC (“New York City 
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B. Hiding Police Disciplinary Records Undermines the Public’s Trust 
in the Police Disciplinary System 
The right of access to trials was not always a right to which the ac-
cused or the public were entitled.43 The 17th century English trial of King 
Charles I for wide-scale human rights abuses changed that. For that trial, 
the government decided that to be legitimate, “justice must be seen to be 
done,” and arranged for a large courtroom to conduct the trial as openly 
and audibly as possible. 44 The English government, motivated as much 
by fear of violent public opposition as by what they believed was a right-
eous cause, recognized then, as did the founders of the American govern-
ment later, that the practice of justice has a dual nature: actual and theat-
rical. 
American courts, both criminal and civil, have historically favored 
public proceedings and filings.45 The United States Supreme Court ex-
plained the important role that publicity plays specifically in criminal tri-
als: 
Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safe-
guards the integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to 
both the defendant and to society as a whole. Moreover, public 
access to the criminal trial fosters an appearance of fairness, 
thereby heightening public respect for the judicial process. And 
in the broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits the 
public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial pro-
cess - an essential component in our structure of self-government. 
 
has paid $384 million settling about 5,800 police misconduct claims in the past five 
years . . . .”). 
 43 See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, THE TYRANNICIDE BRIEF: THE STORY OF THE MAN WHO 
SENT CHARLES I TO THE SCAFFOLD 151 (2005) (“Charles I was brought to trial at a time when 
defendants had no rights other than to be tried quickly . . . .”). 
 44 Id. at 145-47 (“Cromwell wanted to play to the larger gallery . . . so that the justice of 
the proceedings could be more widely appreciated . . . . [because of terrible acoustics in the 
Hall] the judges were particularly concerned that justice must be seen to be done, because it 
would not be heard to be done. It would be read, at least: twelve short-hand reporters were 
permitted to form the first press gallery.”). In this article, I extrapolate this concern for “justice 
to be seen” from the logistical, literal concern for physical access, visibility, and audible acous-
tics during Charles I’s trial to the political rational for public access to information and gov-
ernmental proceedings. 
 45 See Ardia, supra note 12, at 839 n.20 (citing 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF 
JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827)) (“Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in com-
parison of publicity, all other checks are of small account.”). Ardia also warns against recent 
judicial trends towards sealing. Id. at 916. 
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In sum, the institutional value of the open criminal trial is recog-
nized in both logic and experience.46 
While the Supreme Court has not clearly extended a constitutional 
right for public access to civil trials, judges have similarly opined about 
the value of publicly dealing with private matters in civil cases: 
It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the 
public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with an-
other are of public concern, but because it is of the highest mo-
ment that those who administer justice should always act under 
the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be 
able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which 
a public duty is performed.47 
A central principle of our government is that its actual and perceived 
functionality is improved by its openness to the public; an open society 
“sets free the critical powers of man.”48 Similar to the English govern-
ment’s conclusion that the trial of the King must be literally seen and 
heard for the legitimacy of the trial to be preserved, American courts have 
repeatedly concluded that it is not enough for a process to be fair behind 
closed doors, or for a legal body to reach an ostensibly right outcome 
without publicly demonstrating how it was reached. Some jurisdictions, 
like New York, will extend public right to access beyond judicial courts 
to quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, 49 because “[t]he pub-
lic’s right of access to an adjudicatory proceeding does not depend on 
which branch of government houses that proceeding.”50 
 
 46 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the Cty. of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 606 
(1982) (citations omitted) (finding that the government’s justification for baring press and 
public from the courtroom must be “weighty;” the closure must serve a compelling govern-
mental interest that is narrowly tailored). 
 47 Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884). 
 48 KARL R. POPPER, Author’s introduction to 1 THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 1 (5th 
ed. 1966). 
 49 Associated Press v. Bell, 70 N.Y.2d 32, 36-38 (1987) (“Plainly the First Amendment 
right of access is not limited to the criminal trial itself.”); but see Johnson Newspaper Corp. 
v. Clary, 167 A.D.2d 968 (4th Dep’t 1990) (finding no First Amendment right of public access 
because defendant had not previously made the subject of the proceedings public). 
 50 NYCLU v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 290 (2d Cir. 2012) (extended the right 
of access to quasi-judicial proceedings before the New York City Transit Authority’s 
(“NYCTA”) Transit Adjudication Bureau (“TAB”)). Not every state’s law recognizes its cit-
izenry’s expectation of publicity for its police disciplinary hearings. See, e.g., Copley Press, 
Inc. v. Superior Court of San Diego Cty., 141 P.3d 288, 307 (Cal. 2006) (holding that a First 
Amendment argument failed to prevent police disciplinary hearings from being closed to the 
public). However, becuase some criminal conduct may be adjudicated in these closed pro-
ceedings, an argument for access under the First Amendment may be available to the extent 
officers are administratively prosecuted for criminal conduct. 
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In 2018, BuzzFeed filed a brief seeking First Amendment right of 
access to police disciplinary hearing transcripts.51 In early 2018, a 
BuzzFeed investigative reporter arrived mid-way through a disciplinary 
hearing for an officer who claimed she was targeted for punishment based 
on her race.52 When BuzzFeed formally requested the transcript at the be-
ginning and the end of the hearing, the NYPD responded that it would 
determine the request under New York’s Freedom of Information laws.53 
BuzzFeed sued for its right to the transcripts of the proceeding under the 
First Amendment on the basis that the hearings are public proceedings, 
rejecting the NYPD’s attempt to address the request under Freedom of 
Information laws.54 
Two showings are required to establish a First Amendment right of 
access.55 First, the plaintiff must show that that the administrative hearing 
is an adjudicatory proceeding that has a historical expectation of publicity 
and access to such proceedings.56 Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that related records play a “significant positive role in the functioning” of 
the system in question.57 BuzzFeed argued police departmental trials are 
“[l]ike any other civil or criminal proceeding, . . . serv[ing] a fact finding 
 
 51 Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner’s Application Pursuant to Article 78 at 
10-27, BuzzFeed, Inc. v. Deputy Commissioner, Index No. 155278/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 
5, 2018) [hereinafter BuzzFeed Memorandum of Law]. 
 52 Id. at 6, 20. 
 53 Id. at 8. 
 54 Id. at 10-27. Contrast this argument with NYCLU, who also brought a suit seeking 
administrative law decisions, as opposed to hearing transcripts. NYCLU v. NYPD, No. 133, 
2018 WL 6492733 (Dec. 11, 2018). While NYCLU, a New York-based civil rights organiza-
tion, also sought the decisions on the basis that the hearings are public proceedings, its argu-
ments focused on interpretations of New York State Freedom of Information laws (“FOIL”) 
and Civil Rights Law § 50-a and not the constitutional First Amendment arguments that 
BuzzFeed, a national news organization, made. See NYCLU v. NYPD, 148 A.D.3d 642, 642 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2017). The Court of Appeals decision did not address whether NYCLU had 
a right to access the administrative law decisions under the First Amendment because it was 
not argued. Judge Wilson’s dissent, while not citing the First Amendment analysis, argued 
along similar lines that because the proceedings were public, related documents used in the 
proceedings should presumptively be public, as well. See NYCLU v. NYPD, 2018 WL 
6492733, at *17 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“By opening the Trial Room proceedings to the pub-
lic, the City has chosen to disclose information relevant to that proceeding. In doing so, the 
City has determined that the confidentiality of an officer’s identity, the nature of the charged 
offense, or the evidence supporting that charge—otherwise protected by section 50-a—is of 
insubstantial weight compared to the countervailing interest in public disclosure.”). 
 55 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for the Cty. of Riverside 
(Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
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purpose and culminat[ing] in a legal decision through an adversarial pro-
cess—making public access essential to the efficacy of the proceeding.”58 
Their brief outlined all of the parallels between court proceedings and po-
lice disciplinary hearings to demonstrate that since “departmental trials 
are close cousins of traditional adjudicatory proceedings, the benefits of 
openness in [the adjudicatory] context[] apply equally [to the former].”59 
To demonstrate a historical expectation of publicity, BuzzFeed reviewed 
public police misconduct trials from 150 years ago through the present.60 
BuzzFeed addressed the second prong of the test by outlining multi-
ple benefits served by transparency of police disciplinary transcripts.61 
These benefits mirror those named by David Ardia, Co-Director of the 
University of North Carolina Center for Media Law and Policy, in favor 
of a First Amendment right of access to court proceedings and filings.62 
Ardia’s benefits inventory includes improving the outcomes of individual 
court proceedings by keeping participants honest and deterring unjust 
prosecutions.63 He also analyzes how transparency benefits a system by 
“mak[ing] it more likely that systemic problems will be identified, cor-
rected, and deterred.”64 Finally, Ardia’s framework warns against the 
harms of secrecy. He examines decisions discussing how secretive sys-
tems breed “corruption, incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice, and favor-
itism,” ultimately undermining public confidence in those systems’ func-
tionality.65 
Despite allowing public access to hearings conducted by the Deputy 
Commissioner of Trials at One Police Plaza, the NYPD’s disciplinary 
system is secretive.66 Findings of fact and final penalty recommendations 
 
 58 See BuzzFeed Memorandum of Law, supra note 51, at 19 (citing 38 R.C.N.Y. § 15-01, 
et seq. (2018)). 
 59 Id. at 19-20. For more information about procedures of departmental trials, including 
discovery, motion practice, opening and closing statements, witnesses to be called and cross 
examined, evidence introduced, and findings of fact formulated, see 38 R.C.N.Y. §§ 15-
03(f)(2), 15-03(g) and §§ 15-04(b), 15-04(e)(3), 15-04(e)(1), 15-04(f) (2018), which 
BuzzFeed cited in their memorandum of law. BuzzFeed Memorandum of Law, supra note 51, 
at 2-3. 
 60 BuzzFeed Memorandum of Law, supra note 51, at 14-17 (citations omitted). 
 61 Id. at 17-21. 
 62 Ardia, supra note 12, at 894-97. 
 63 Id. at 895-96. 
 64 Id. at 896-97 (emphasis added). 
 65 NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 980 P.2d 
337, 360 n.28 (1999) (quoting Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d 777, 784 (Ct. App. 1977) 
(noting the function of accessible civil cases)). 
 66 The Administrative Prosecution Unit (APU), N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., 
https://perma.cc/MS9P-2QRN (last visited Jan. 2, 2019) (“[i]n the most serious cases the 
CCRB prosecutes members of the NYPD in front of the Deputy Commissioner of Trials at 1 
Police Plaza. These trials are open to the public. Penalties for officers found guilty range from 
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by NYPD administrative law judges (ALJs) resulting from those hearings, 
even in cases prosecuted by Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB), 
are not public, nor are final decisions made by the Police Commissioner.67 
The Commissioner’s sole authority over final disciplinary decisions 
makes the need for public oversight all the more important.68 Yet in 2017, 
the NYPD took a step further away from this already slim amount of pub-
lic oversight. 
The 2017 trial of Officer James Frascatore, who tackled professional 
tennis player James Blake after mistaking him for someone suspected of 
a crime, demonstrates how a courtroom closure impacted the public trust 
in the police disciplinary system. Before Frascatore’s trial, in January 
2017, former officer Daniel Modell testified as an expert witness on be-
half of officer Richard Haste for the killing of Ramarley Graham.69 He 
was questioned, at Haste’s departmental trial, in open court about his own 
disciplinary history without limitation and it was reported on by the 
press.70 The public audience could judge whether the prior misconduct 
made Modell’s expert testimony unreliable. Later, in September 2017, 
Modell was again called as an expert, this time by officer James Fras-
catore. The prosecutor, in front of the same ALJ as in January 2017, at-
tempted to confront the same expert, about the same prior disciplinary 
history. The public and the press were in the room, as before, but this time 
the NYPD’s ALJ prevented the questioning to protect disclosure of the 
 
warning and admonishment, loss of vacation days, suspension without pay, dismissal proba-
tion, or termination from the NYPD. The Police Commissioner remains the final arbiter of 
discipline, but gives written explanations when he deviates from the CCRB’s recommenda-
tions”). Some officers are prosecuted by the Department Advocate administrative prosecutors 
and some, pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding between NYPD and CCRB, are pros-
ecuted by the CCRB’s Administrative Prosecution Unit (“APU”). APU Memorandum of Un-
derstanding, N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., https://perma.cc/ND3T-9VCQ (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2019). The public nature of these administrative trials was unsuccessfully chal-
lenged by Schenectady officers in 2011 in Doe v. City of Schenectady. The police union “on 
behalf of all its similarly-situated members--commenced the instant combined declaratory 
judgment action and proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 seeking, among other things, an 
order permanently enjoining respondents from conducting public hearings in connection with 
police disciplinary proceedings.” Doe v. City of Schenectady, 84 A.D.3d 1455, 1456 (3d Dep’t 
2011). 
 
 67 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW 
BOARD (CCRB) AND THE POLICE DEPARTMENT (NYPD) OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 
CONCERNING THE PROCESSING OF SUBSTANTIATED COMPLAINTS 4 (Apr. 4, 2012). 
 68 Graham Rayman & Rocco Parascandola, Critics of NYPD Disciplinary Process Push 
for Dramatic Changes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 2, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://perma.cc/M2SN-
XMHT (outlining advocates’ view that NYPD disciplinary hearings should be conducted by 
an outside agency, rather than the Commissioner of Trials). 
 69 Southall, supra note 5. 
 70 See, e.g., id. 
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officer’s misconduct history.71 After the prosecutor pressed the ALJ to 
allow the questions, the judge forced the public and the press to leave the 
room, and then limited the questions, citing New York State’s Civil 
Rights Law 50-a.72 
The NYPD judge’s decision to close the courtroom in the James 
Blake trial disrupted that proceeding’s integrity by forcing the public out. 
The press was not there to report how prohibitive the limitations were and 
the public was not able to consider whether that former officer’s prior bad 
acts lessened his reliability as an expert defending Frascatore’s conduct. 
This lack of access harmed the public’s ability to judge for itself the rea-
sonableness of that individual proceeding’s outcome.73 It is not enough, 
as the court trying Charles I knew, to find the right outcome; “justice must 
be seen to be done.”74 Regardless of how that judge ruled on the expert’s 
credibility, which we will also never know under the current interpreta-
tion of the law, the public was not able to see justice be done, 75 a “vital” 
feature of the disciplinary process according to CCRB Director Jonathan 
Darche. 76 Closing the courtroom poisoned the public’s perception of that 
trial with cynicism and distrust as evidenced by the N.Y. Times headline, 
At James Blake Trial, Judge Invokes Law Shielding Police Records, em-
phasizing the closure rather than anything that happened during the trial.77 
As a result, the NYPD judge undermined the principle that “those who 
administer justice should always act under the sense of public responsi-
bility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own 
eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed.”78 
 
 71 See id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Professor Kate Levine recently argued that a “proper balance” of transparency and pri-
vacy for police complaint and disciplinary records would be the availability of records for all 
parties in litigation pursuant to sealing, gag orders, and courtroom closures as deemed appro-
priate by the courts. Levine, supra note 7 (recommending that information about officer mis-
conduct should be collected in a federal database and accessible by all law enforcement agen-
cies for the purpose of vetting officers applying for positions). But, the availability of those 
records in litigation is not transparency, it is discovery; it should already be available as 
needed. To the extent this compromise introduces increased sealing or court closures into a 
judicial process still operating with some expectation of transparency, especially in the crim-
inal context, such a compromise would deteriorate fairness, legitimacy, and trust in the court 
system as it has in the police disciplinary system. 
 74 ROBERTSON, supra note 43, at 146. 
 75 See BuzzFeed Memorandum of Law, supra note 51, at 18, for a description of how 
open proceedings enhance efficacy and increases just outcomes. 
 76 Southall, supra note 5. See also BuzzFeed Memorandum of Law, supra note 51 for an 
explanation of how access to proceedings promotes fairness. 
 77 Southall, supra note 5. 
 78 Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884). 
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Hiding misconduct records of public officials further harms the le-
gitimacy of the police and the authority of government by obstructing the 
public’s “checking function.”79 This can result not only in people harmed 
by police not pursuing administrative remedies, they may also not trust 
the system when in danger. Sunita Patel is an Associate Professor at 
UCLA who researches social movement theory, police misconduct, and 
civil rights. Describing legitimacy in relation to policing, she explains 
that, “when police processes are perceived as procedurally just, commu-
nities are more likely to cooperate with the police, and policing, in turn, 
is more effective.”80 In order to foster this perception communities need 
access to the charges, common law decisions, proceedings, and outcomes 
in order to see justice for themselves. Legitimacy must be built upon both 
actual and theatrical access to the system. 
Contrary to the increased opacity many union representatives claim 
will improve the fairness of the disciplinary system, officers also lose out 
when police departments hide their misconduct. When departments con-
ceal the average penalty for any specific offense, it prevents officers who 
have been treated unfairly from analyzing whether their penalty was dis-
proportionately harsh. Investigations into racially biased or disproportion-
ately punitive treatment could utilize data of reasonable or average pen-
alties for similar misconduct.81 Yet, BuzzFeed’s investigative reporter, 
attempting to write the story about a Black woman wrongly accused of 
misconduct by a supervisor, cannot access sufficient data for her in-depth 
article about racial discrimination in the police disciplinary process or 
even get a transcript from one hearing.82 This secrecy also allows abusive 
supervisors the same type of powerful, reliable impunity when disciplin-
ing officers that police officers have when arresting citizens.83 Increased 
transparency of the police disciplinary process could deter unjust prose-
cutions of police, as well as disproportionately harsh penalties for minor 
misconduct. 
 
 79 BuzzFeed Memorandum of Law, supra note 51, at 18 (providing support for how pub-
licity provides a “checking function”). 
 80 Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engage-
ment” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 802 (2016). 
 81 See Levine, supra note 7 (suggesting that publicizing police disciplinary records in the 
correct context would address concerns officers claim over minor misconduct stigmatizing 
officers unfairly). 
 82 BuzzFeed Memorandum of Law, supra note 51, at 6. 
 83 For an example of this power dynamic, see Graham Rayman, Exclusive: NYPD Ser-
geant Says Promotion to Lieutenant Was Blocked Due to His Support of Colin Kaepernick, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 01, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://perma.cc/M398-BMDQ (“[T]he case is 
yet another example of a double standard ingrained in the NYPD’s disciplinary system.”). 
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When no participant in either system trusts the process or the fairness 
of the outcomes, the result is alienation of all parties impacted by the sys-
tem, both officers and harmed civilians. People harmed by police may 
feel pursuing justice is hopeless. Individual police officers feel isolated 
from the department and unfairly persecuted for following supervisors’ 
orders.84 Without the benefit of statistics and data to ground the harm ex-
perienced by both community members and police officers, their stories 
remain isolated tragedies, at best resolved with money settlements. This 
not only hinders people fighting for systemic changes, it harms the public 
from learning about the system and what changes it needs. 
C. Hiding Police Disciplinary Records Harms Public Discourse 
If “[p]ublicity is the very soul of justice,”85 The removal of decades 
of police disciplinary information from the City Hall archives is itself an 
injustice to New Yorkers. From 1972 until 2016, the Deputy Commis-
sioner of Public Information of the NYPD updated personnel orders with 
summaries of charged misconduct and disciplinary penalties that hung on 
a clipboard on the wall outside that office for reporters to review.86 Fol-
lowing The Legal Aid Society’s open record request in April 2016 for 
five years of these summaries, NYPD officials directed all police disci-
pline information to be removed from this clipboard, as well as from City 
Hall archives.87 In addition to the removal of disciplinary summaries from 
 
 84 See Kendall Taggart et al., Here’s Why BuzzFeed News Is Publishing Thousands of 
Secret NYPD Documents, BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 16, 2018, 5:33 AM), 
https://perma.cc/7S6W-H37U (“Many officers told BuzzFeed News that the disciplinary sys-
tem is unfair. Some said it lets guilty officers off the hook. Others said it punishes people for 
reporting misconduct or just for getting on their supervisors’ bad sides.”). For Roy Richter’s, 
President of the NYPD Captain’s Endowment Association, interpretation of this balance, see 
Transcript of the Minutes of the Committee on Public Safety at 123-24, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL 
(Oct. 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/MG6S-2XXJ (follow the “Hearing Transcript” hyperlink) 
(“When a subject officer is charged with abuse of authority for violating the constitutional 
rights of an individual, and review of the facts reflect that the officer acted in good faith, 
consistent with their training, Department policy and the law, these officers should not have 
to put their careers on hold while defending themselves in a prolonged administrative prose-
cution.”). 
 85 JEREMY BENTHAM, BENTHAM’S DRAUGHT FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL 
ESTABLISHMENTS, COMPARED WITH THAT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, in 4 THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 305, 316 (John Bowring ed., 1843). 
 86 See Petitioners Memorandum of Law at 7, Luongo v. Records Access Officer of the 
NYPD, Index No. 160232/2016, at 7; Rick Rojas, New York Police Dept., Citing Law, Stops 
Sharing Personnel Data, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2016), https://perma.cc/4UYZ-NTJW (“The 
[personnel orders] include[] changes in duty, promotions, retirements and deaths, as well as 
information on disciplinary actions taken against officers . . . . The personnel orders typically 
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 87 Petitioners Memorandum of Law, Luongo v. Records Access Officer of the NYPD, 
supra note 86; See Rocco Parascandola & Graham Rayman, Exclusive: NYPD Suddenly Stops 
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city archives, the NYPD also withholds written decisions by its ALJs.88 
An entire common law exists among the administrative judges in the 
NYPD trial room. Their Reports and Recommendations interpreting rules 
in the Patrol Guide cite prior reports to support their conclusions about 
whether misconduct occurred,89 but because their decisions are not avail-
able these norms are unknown to the public, hindering its understanding 
of how police are judged.90 For example, NYPD judges may cite prior 
decisions interpreting how force may be used when a false start is material 
or when officers may curse. 
This opacity specifically hinders First Amendment values favoring 
availability of information “about the exercise of governmental power, 
educating individuals about the implementation and impact of the law, 
and fostering discussion about matters of public concern.”91 When no out-
comes of disciplinary hearings are made public, the police department can 
claim that a fully functional police accountability system exists—whether 
true or not—without any contradictory evidence publicly accessible.92 
Even if it is a functional system, depriving the public of any ability to 
judge for itself is not justice. When a system loses the trust of the public, 
it has likely also lost the confidence of the people most directly impacted 
by it. 
 
Sharing Records on Cop Discipline in Move Watchdogs Slam as Anti-Transparency, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (Aug. 24, 2016, 10:57 PM), https://perma.cc/9DJV-4SQT (illustrating that, for 
decades, reporters have had access to a “Personnel Orders” clipboard hanging in the depart-
ment’s public information office, which listed administrative cases closed out either by a plea 
deal or by an internal trial held at 1 Police Plaza). 
 88 Brief for Petitioner at 6, NYCLU v. NYPD, 148 A.D.3d 642 (2017). 
 89 38 R.C.N.Y. § 15-06 (a)(2) (2018) (directing the Deputy Commissioner of Trials 
(DCT) to issue a “Draft Report and Recommendation” with findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, plus a recommendation for disposition). The draft is sent to the parties for review and 
opportunity to comment. Id. § 15-06(c). The DCT finalizes and sends the Report and Recom-
mendation to the Police Commissioner, with transcript of proceedings, exhibits and comments 
submitted by parties. Id. 
 90 For an example of how the NYPD trial room common law plays out, see Robert Lewis 
& Noah Veltman, The Hard Truth About Cops Who Lie, WNYC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/4YQL-QF6N (relaying that, in November 2014, a Deputy Commissioner of 
Trials allowed an officer to keep their job despite making false statements, because officers in 
similar cases heard by the Commissioner of Trials had not been terminated). 
 91 Ardia, supra note 12, at 897. 
 92 See Jillian Jorgensen et al., De Blasio, NYPD Big See No Problem with How Cops 
Address Police Misconduct, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 15, 2018, 10:06 PM), 
https://perma.cc/ZQD3-JVFD (quoting Mayor deBlasio and Deputy Commissioner Benjamin 
Tucker saying that the NYPD’s disciplinary system is fair in response to a Daily News inves-
tigation on disparities in punishment). 
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“[I]nformation is power, or, to put it more finely, disproportionate 
access to information is power.”93 Rather than questioning the compe-
tency of community members to understand the context and significance 
of events, we should embrace the potential for a contested process to “el-
evate[]the role of stakeholders and affected individuals” to “create[] the 
potential for a shift in power between communities and the police.”94 Ob-
taining collective clarity around complex issues calls for creative report-
ing, education, and conversation, not the withholding of information.95 
No matter how complex, “[t]he people’s right to know the process of gov-
ernmental decision-making and to review the documents and statistics 
leading to determinations is basic to our society.”96 Society also benefits 
from the inclusion of community perspectives. “Involving the community 
as an equal stakeholder in the deliberative process enables individuals to 
understand their roles in solving communal problems and therefore con-
tribute more meaningfully to the implementation of solutions.”97 
Hiding police disciplinary records also harms public discourse of the 
police disciplinary system by preventing informed public debate about 
what should be considered “minor” police misconduct in determining dis-
ciplinary penalties. When an officer’s shirt is not ironed, it may obviously 
be a minor penalty, but other types of misconduct deserve debate. “Which 
offense is worse?,” a Daily News article, reporting on two offenses com-
mitted by high ranking officers who were disparately punished for, asked: 
dating a man with a conviction record or “fudging statistics and encour-
aging mass arrests?”98 The former Captain who dated a man with a con-
viction record was suspended and demoted.99 The Deputy Inspector who 
manipulated crime statistics only lost a few vacation days.100 More regular 
reporting on these disparities might influence public debate, initiate cam-
paigns by elected officials, and be the foundation for the type of systemic 
change needed to make the police disciplinary system more effective at 
 
 93 About: Our Mission, SUNLIGHT FOUND., https://perma.cc/7UGU-K2H8 (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2019) (“The Sunlight Foundation is a national, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that 
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 94 Patel, supra note 80, at 798. 
 95 See infra II.B.2.: Distortion. 
 96 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 (McKinney 2018). 
 97 Patel, supra note 80, at 806 (citing Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: 
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170 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:1 
holding police accountable. This level of reporting is not possible without 
transparency of police disciplinary information.  
Hiding NYPD’s disciplinary data from the public also prevents the 
public from weighing in on whether, for example, unlawful stop-and-
frisks are minor violations or something more serious. Before stopping 
Eric Garner in 2014, Officer Daniel Pantaleo unlawfully frisked someone 
in 2012.101 While the CCRB recommended eight vacation days forfeiture 
for Officer Pantaleo, the NYPD only penalized him for two vacation 
days.102 Even the NYPD’s court-ordered revision of its stop-and-frisk pol-
icy defines “isolated” unlawful stops or unlawful frisks as minor.103 The 
people subjected to unlawful stops or unlawful frisks may feel very dif-
ferently based on the many psychological, social, and professional effects 
they report.104 Yet whether these effects are considered when the police 
department concludes, as a policy, that unlawful stops may be considered 
minor is not apparent. Police departments should weigh public opinion 
about such questions to pierce the otherwise isolated understanding of 
what is minor versus significant misconduct. Business ethicists and group 
psychologists have identified this isolation, which afflicts social groups 
like police, as “ethical blindness”:  
[W]hether or not a person becomes aware of a decision’s ethical 
dimension depends on the sensemaking process unfolding within 
 
 101 Officer Pantaleo’s misconduct history was only made available through leaks, since 
New York State Civil Rights Law § 50-a specifically protects police officers’ records. Al 
Baker & Benjamin Mueller, Records Leak in Eric Garner Case Renews Debate on Police 
Discipline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/3C4J-3LYG; Carimah Townes & 
Jack Jenkins, Exclusive Documents: The Disturbing Secret History of the NYPD Officer Who 
Killed Eric Garner, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 21, 2017, 2:09 PM), https://perma.cc/JRT7-3QLE; 
see also Levine, supra note 7 (citing the Baker & Mueller article from the New York Times 
in concluding the release of Pantaleo’s misconduct history was inconclusive and arguing re-
lease of his records would not have contributed anything to public sentiment or NYPD’s pro-
cess). 
 102 Townes & Jenkins, supra note 101. The CCRB’s ability to document the difference 
between what the public and the NYPD might consider to be “just” is limited to administrative 
employment penalties, and has been further watered down by the reconsideration process. 
Benjamin Mueller, New York Police Challenging More of Review Board’s Findings, Study 
Shows, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/SVM5-9PCR. 
 103 NYPD, PATROL GUIDE PROCEDURE NO. 212-11: INVESTIGATIVE ENCOUNTERS: 
REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, COMMON LAW RIGHT OF INQUIRY AND LEVEL 3 STOPS (2016) 
was enacted through a court-ordered process following the 2013 finding that New York’s stop-
and-frisk policy was unconstitutional in Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 689 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). It specifies that “[m]inor or inadvertent mistakes in documentation or iso-
lated cases of erroneous but good-faith stops or frisks by members of the service should ordi-
narily be addressed through instruction and training.” NYPD, PATROL GUIDE PROCEDURE NO. 
212-11, supra. 
 104 See sources cited, supra note 32. 
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the social group that the person is part of. We suggest that the 
sensemaking process leading to ethical blindness is based on the 
interplay between a tendency toward rigid framing and contextual 
pressures. Frames make us view the world from one particular and 
thus necessarily limited perspective. They have blind spots. The 
more rigidly people apply specific frames when making deci-
sions, the lower their ability to switch to another perspective. 
They are locked into one frame.105   
Police, as a social group, create an ethical framework divorced from 
the framework of the communities they serve because they are locked into 
their own frame.106 Concealing their disciplinary system’s records only 
serves to strengthen these frames and to prevent probing them.107 Trans-
parency around disciplinary outcomes could expose other discrepancies 
between what officers consider minor misconduct and what the public 
considers significant misconduct, strengthening discussions around po-
lice accountability systems.   
Having more information like this to expose discord between the 
public’s and the police’s sense of justice around specific issues would im-
prove public discourse, educate the public about the context of minor of-
fenses, help the police understand public perception of those offenses, and 
contribute to solutions for the accountability system. In other words, arm-
ing the public with the knowledge of how conduct is adjudicated inter-
nally would permit calibration with those internal processes and outside 
societal norms. Police acknowledging the public’s perspective on, for ex-
ample, why an unlawful stop-and-frisk causes major harm benefits the 
public discourse, could improve the perception of fairness for all, and ul-
timately balance the normative framework for deciding police discipline. 
Police disciplinary systems benefit from checks by an informed pub-
lic—not only because the public can pierce the rigid framing of police 
perspective—but also because they broaden the definition of the problem 
from bad actors to bad systems.108 Deliberative democracy “emphasize[s] 
 
 105 Guido Palazzo et al., Ethical Blindness, 109 J. BUS. ETHICS 323, 324 (2012). 
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the right, opportunity, and capacity of anyone subject to a collectively 
made decision to participate in a meaningful way in deliberations regard-
ing decisions that affect him or her.”109 How police officers are held ac-
countable, especially for their conduct towards members of the public, 
should be subject to our deliberative democracy. To do otherwise is un-
democratic: 
The very fact of exclusion from participation is a subtle form of 
suppression. It gives individuals no opportunity to reflect and de-
cide upon what is good for them. Others who are supposed to be 
wiser and who in any case have more power decide the question 
for them and also decide the methods and means by which sub-
jects may arrive at the enjoyment of what is good for them. This 
form of coercion and suppression is more subtle and more effec-
tive than is overt intimidation and restraint.110  
Excluding the public from participation in an informed debate about 
police misconduct and leaving decisions about their daily experiences of 
injustice in the hands of government agencies, lawyers, and courts de-
prives society of the public’s solutions.111 This is a major loss. The person 
experiencing injustices in their daily life knows more precisely “where 
the shoe pinches,”112 and can contribute more valuable solutions than a 
judge or lawyer trying to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of a 
person experiencing police abuse. 
There are relatively few modern examples of public access to police 
misconduct information with which to elicit proof of this; but, ambitious 
efforts are underway to open this monopoly on information about police 
misconduct from government bodies.113 When the police do not tightly 
monopolize this information, such as in Chicago following the death of 
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Laquan McDonald, the family, community, and police reform advocates 
retain more power and capacity to call for change from elected officials.114 
The thousands of protesters in Chicago, for example, were not just calling 
for justice for Laquan McDonald, or indictment of the officer responsible 
for his killing, they were calling for the DOJ to hold the entire Chicago 
Police Department accountable through an investigation.115 The access to 
more information did not demonize a single police officer as much as it 
woke Chicago up to much larger structural problems.116 
The Chicago Citizens Police Data Project, a database of thirty years 
of police misconduct information, and the action it supports is a great ex-
ample of this.117 In another publication, the author discussed how trans-
parency of police disciplinary records promotes systemic reforms by 
comparing Chicago following the release of recordings showing Officer 
Jason Van Dyke shooting Laquan McDonald, with the killing of Eric Gar-
ner.118 Years after Mr. McDonald was killed, the Chicago public has 
maintained pressure on its city officials to not only fire, indict, and even-
tually convict Van Dyke, but to reform its accountability system through 
protests, investigative reports, editorials, opinion pieces, and academic 
studies. This public pressure resulted in the loss of an election by the in-
cumbent county prosecutor, the firing of the police chief, and culminated 
in the ultimate demonstration of electoral power on the eve of Van Dyke’s 
trial for McDonald’s death, when Mayor Rahm Emanuel announced he 
would not be seeking a third term.119 Many attribute the end of these po-
litical careers to how Chicago failed Mr. McDonald—in part by allowing 
 
 114 See Michael Martinez, Protesters Disrupt Chicago Shopping, Ask Feds to Probe 
McDonald Killing, CNN, https://perma.cc/5TCB-EHY6 (last updated Nov. 28, 2015, 2:26 
PM). 
 115 Id. 
 116 See infra II.B.3.: Increased Accessibility. 
 117 See Citizens Police Data Project, INVISIBLE INST., https://perma.cc/HC4Z-JW3V (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2019). 
 118 Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, Defending the Public: Police Accountability in the Courtroom, 
46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1063, 1065-66 (2016). 
 119 Dahleen Glanton, Column: Laquan McDonald Was Shot Down by Police, and He Took 
the Mayor’s Career Down with Him, CHI. TRIBUNE (Sept. 6, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/X98T-TURN; Bill Ruthhart, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel Explains the 
Surprise That Shook the City and Why He Won’t Seek Re-election, CHI. TRIBUNE (Sept. 5, 
2018, 7:50 AM), https://perma.cc/P4VS-LAAU (“Emanuel’s advisers insisted the Van Dyke 
trial played no factor in his decision, but many political insiders acknowledged that if the 
officer were to be acquitted, the mayor’s chances of winning re-election would have been 
significantly damaged. By making a final decision before the trial, Emanuel removed the pos-
sibility of looking reactive to a verdict, whichever way the case goes.”). Emanuel was respon-
sible for blocking the release of police videos showing officers murdering Laquan McDonald. 
Bernard E. Harcourt, Cover-Up in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/4L59-LD6G; Brentin Mock, How Rahm Emanuel Blew it on Police Reform, 
CITYLAB (Sept. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/FD3F-9A8F. 
174 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:1 
Officer Van Dyke to accumulate so many community complaints and re-
peatedly escape accountability.120 Compare New York City’s backslide 
in the same time period under a “progressive” mayor: the NYPD has 
failed to fire Daniel Pantaleo who has collected thousands of dollars in 
overtime121 and will collect thousands more in his recently vested pen-
sion.122 Some claim, following a leak of Pantaleo’s civilian complaint his-
tory from the CCRB, that it failed to bear the same kind of significance to 
Mr. Garner’s death as Van Dyke’s did to Mr. McDonald’s death.123 Yet, 
had the public known from the early days of Mr. Garner’s death, which 
started as an unlawful stop-and-frisk, that Pantaleo had a recently sub-
stantiated complaint of an unlawful frisk, the marches, op-eds, and rallies 
may have focused more on failures of the disciplinary system to deter 
unlawful stop and frisks than on indicting Pantaleo.124 Their messaging 
could have been more concrete, the failures more possible to solve, and 
the political leverage more easily obtained. 
There are many differences between Chicago and New York City, 
but when it comes to how the issue of police accountability has been ad-
dressed for the last five years, one major difference is transparency of 
police disciplinary records. Rather than resulting in salacious gossip of 
isolated instances of misconduct, the Chicago database allows community 
members and reporters to focus on the commanders allowing misconduct 
to flourish, such as the former Chicago Police Superintendent Eddie John-
son.125 A creative publication like Citizens Police Data Project stimulates 
helpful public debate over systemic reform. An informed debate about a 
police disciplinary system may question whether certain types of miscon-
duct have too broad a range of penalties. It may question whether a type 
of lenient penalty is too often the outcome for serious misconduct like 
false statements. It may question whether certain types of misconduct, 
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like unlawful stops, come more often from particular commands or 
whether certain high ranks are less likely to receive serious penalties. The 
Chicago database is the type of publication that empowers communities 
to push reforms with data-driven analysis, to lobby for specific policies 
and call on lawmakers to hold hearings, to draft legislation, to campaign 
for reforms, and to make systemic change. It enables the community to 
face the problem in order to change it. 
Hiding police disciplinary information amplifies harms to families 
and communities, promotes distrust in justice systems, and hinders the 
public’s ability to engage in reforming police disciplinary systems. Con-
versely, allowing public access to these records translates into the benefit 
of supporting a constitutionally significant right of public access to police 
disciplinary records that supports public oversight of public functions and 
encourages democratic engagement through informed public discourse. 
Against these potential benefits and traumatizing harms, nebulous privacy 
harms by police should be reconsidered. However, we must first precisely 
define what privacy harms we are placing on the other side of the scale. 
PART II: MEASURING THE WEIGHT OF POLICE PRIVACY HARMS 
Police unions have dominated thinking and policies around publish-
ing of police disciplinary records for decades, usually through their ex-
tremely politically powerful and well-funded unions. The New York City 
Police Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA), for example, paid for 
officers to fly Iowa to protest Mayor de Blasio, whose security detail is 
also staffed by NYPD officers, making the Mayor both politically and 
personally dependent on the NYPD.126 As Patrick Lynch said, “[w]e’ve 
woke him up in the morning and put him to bed at night . . . . And we’ve 
met him at the gym . . . . We’re going to pop up where he pops up.”127 
The power of around-the-clock protest by armed officers and the influ-
ence it undoubtedly has on elected officials cannot be understated. 
Police union rhetoric supporting secrecy of misconduct records 
heavily cites to privacy and safety concerns of officers who fear access to 
their residential, family, or financial information will make them vulner-
able to vindictive or conspiring criminals.128 Access to personal infor-
mation about officers is undisputed private information that should not be 
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disclosed and is already covered under New York State FOIL exemptions, 
and many other states’ exemptions, as information that if disclosed would 
be an “unwarranted invasion of privacy.”129 Even when focused on disci-
plinary information alone, police still argue that they have an elevated 
privacy interest in their prior misconduct due to their responsibility to tes-
tify in court and vulnerability to public smear campaigns by private citi-
zens with “an ax to grind”.130 How police articulate elevated privacy ex-
pectations in their disciplinary information above what their colleagues in 
state and city governments expect and above what courts have decided is 
reasonable will be studied in this section. 
In making the argument for elevated privacy interests, police have 
capitalized on pliant definitions of privacy. “Privacy is far too vague a 
concept to guide adjudication and lawmaking, as abstract incantations of 
the importance of ‘privacy’ do not fare well when pitted against more 
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without empirical evidence—claim that Chicago’s rising homicide rate has been caused by 
cops being less willing to be ‘proactive’ on the streets due to constraints imposed by civil 
rights litigation, and for fear of being captured on video and shamed in the media.”); Ben 
Fractenberg, More NYPD Officer Misconduct Being Substantiated Due to Videos, CCRB Says, 
DNAINFO (Oct. 15, 2015, 9:24 AM), https://perma.cc/U6UY-3GLW (“PBA President Patrick 
Lynch said in a statement . . . . ‘[The CCRB] are part of a political apparatus that has been 
systematically denigrating the reputation of a fine police department and its officers and that 
must stop.’”); Letter from Michael J. Bowe, Attorney on Behalf of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent 
Association of the City of New York, to Allison Lucas, Gen. Counsel, BuzzFeed (Apr. 11, 
2018), https://perma.cc/VWH8-RW8K (“Moreover, it is a matter of public record that police 
officers have recently been intentionally targeted for violence, including murder, for nothing 
more than being police officers. This phenomenon has tragically resulted in the murders of 
several police officers in New York City by perpetrators inspired by sensationalized media 
characterizations. BuzzFeed’s illegal publication of the disciplinary histories of specific indi-
viduals will put all 24,000 New York City police officers in danger.”). 
 129 N.Y. PUB. OFF. L. § 87(2)(b). 
 130 See, e.g., Patrick J. Lynch, Why Cops Need a Privacy Shield: The Police Union Boss 
Defends the N.Y. Law Preventing Release of Disciplinary Records, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Dec. 
14, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/S5UJ-L52Y (“[U]nscrupulous attorneys could easily de-
rail criminal trials of the accused . . . . [A]ny private citizen with an ax to grind . . . could use 
[records] as fodder for a public smear campaign . . . .”). 
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concretely stated countervailing interests.”131 For the purposes of balanc-
ing harms of hiding records versus harms to police privacy in determining 
laws and policies around public access to police disciplinary records, it is 
worth discerning the specific types of privacy harms applicable to police 
in that context rather than indiscriminately leaning on the privacy panic 
button. 
To discern these types of privacy, this article will rely on a more 
defined vocabulary around police privacy harms to help us measure them 
more exactly against harms of hiding police disciplinary data. Using con-
stitutional interpretations of police officers’ right to privacy in discipli-
nary records along with state statutes and Daniel Solove’s Taxonomy of 
Privacy, this Part will explore how police rhetoric about privacy should 
be recalibrated before being weighed against public harms of hiding mis-
conduct. 
A. Legal Privacy Protections for Police Officers 
It is important to distinguish between rights to privacy that are 
grounded in the Constitution and the rights crafted by police through lob-
bying for state statutes. Federal constitutional rights to privacy do not pro-
tect officers from disclosure of misconduct committed in their public ca-
pacity. As Federal District Court Judge Jack Weinstein wrote: “The 
privacy interest in this kind of professional record [of a police officer] is 
not substantial, because it is not the kind of ‘highly personal’ information 
warranting constitutional safeguard.”132 Judge Weinstein further empha-
sized that “[t]he privacy interest in nondisclosure of professional records 
 
 131 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 477-78 (2006). 
 132 King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (citations omitted); see also 
Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (“[P]ublic officials . . . are not 
wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of personal life unrelated 
to any acts done by them in their public capacity.”); Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1570 
(10th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted) (“[P]olice internal investigation files were not protected 
by the right to privacy when the ‘documents related simply to the officers’ work as police 
officers.’”); Pirozzi v. City of New York, 950 F. Supp. 90, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 117 F.3d 
722 (2d Cir. 1997) (disclosing statements made in civilian complaint investigations to district 
attorney did not violate Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to privacy); Worden v. 
Provo City, 806 F. Supp. 1512, 1516 (D. Utah 1992) (publishing information in police news-
letter about events surrounding officer’s resignation did not violate Due Process right to pri-
vacy). Compare Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1064 (6th Cir. 1998) (pro-
tecting the privacy of sensitive personal information contained in personnel files including 
officers’ home addresses, phone numbers, social security numbers, and driver’s licenses) and 
Carpenter v. Plattsburgh, 105 A.D.2d 295, 299 (3d Dep’t 1985), aff’d, 66 N.Y.2d 791 (1985) 
(holding that police officers do not have an inherent constitutional right to privacy concerning 
their personnel records), with Hall v. City of Cookeville, 157 F. App’x 809, 812-13 (6th Cir. 
2005) (denying a claim of privacy to contents of a personnel file where the officer had already 
made the information available to the media). 
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should be especially limited in view of the role played by the police of-
ficer as a public servant who must be accountable to public review.”133 
State constitutional rights to privacy have also not been interpreted 
to include blanket protection from public disclosure of police disciplinary 
records. The highest court in Montana agreed with Weinstein about offic-
ers’ expectation of privacy of police disciplinary records: “[I]t is not good 
public policy to recognize an expectation of privacy in protecting the 
identity of a law enforcement officer whose conduct is sufficiently repre-
hensible to merit discipline.”134 While the court recognized the officer 
may claim some privacy interest, it held that “[w]hatever privacy interest 
the officers have in the release of their names as having been disciplined, 
it is not one which society recognizes as a strong right.”135 Even under a 
Hawaiian law recently passed under pressure by police unions to give 
“significant privacy” protections to officers, a court still held that the 
“[p]rivacy interest in police officers’ disciplinary suspension records” 
was subject to “the public’s interest in the information.”136 
Police have also generally lost any claim to invasion of privacy for 
disciplinary records under state Freedom of Information Laws.137 Open 
records laws have built upon the same logic as First Amendment right of 
access to judicial proceedings to extend the expectation of openness to 
other government documents and “hold the governors accountable to the 
 
 133 King, 121 F.R.D. at 191. 
 134 Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Cascade Cty. Sheriff, 775 P.2d 1267, 1269 (1989) (citation 
omitted). 
 135 Id.; see, e.g., Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 737-38 (Alaska 1990) (holding that dis-
closure of police officer’s disciplinary records did not violate officer’s constitutional right to 
privacy, which is protected as fundamental right under Alaska Constitution); see also City of 
Los Angeles v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 52 P.3d 129, 145 (Cal. 2002) (“An of-
ficer’s interest in shielding this type of document from public view is arguably illegitimate. 
The state, too, has no legitimate reason to prohibit the disclosure of a sustained citizen com-
plaint. Certainly, any legitimate interest in destroying such a document is disproportionate to 
the purpose it is designed to serve. On balance then, any privacy interest an officer, his police 
agency, or the state has in the nondisclosure of a sustained citizen complaint must yield to the 
defendant’s constitutional right to effectively cross-examine a prosecution witness with rele-
vant impeachment evidence.”); Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 51, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017), cert. granted, 403 P.3d 144 (Cal. 2017). 
 136 Peer News L.L.C. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu Police Dep’t, 376 P.3d 1, 15 (Haw. 2016); 
see also Disclosure of Police Suspension Records Under the UIPA, OIP PEER NEWS SUMMARY 
(Sept. 19, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/62Z2-KQ6F (discussing the context of the new law passed to protect police 
records). 
 137 See, e.g., Farrell v. Vill. Bd. of Trs. of Vil. of Johnson City, 83 Misc. 2d 125, 128 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1975) (holding that the disclosure of the written reprimands of police officers was not 
an invasion of privacy and supported by public interest). This case preceded and likely 
prompted N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS L. § 50-a (McKinney 2018). 
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governed.”138 As with constitutional claims to privacy rights, courts have 
not found that revealing on-duty misconduct is an invasion of privacy for 
purposes of exempting police disciplinary files under open records re-
quests.139 This conforms with the expectations most government actors 
and state licensed professionals have, including teachers, lawyers, physi-
cians, and other licensed professionals, such as massage therapists, veter-
inarians, and architects.140 Having lost court battles for constitutional or 
state rights to privacy as well as arguments that disclosure of disciplinary 
records are “an invasion of privacy”, police unions have relied heavily on 
Police or Law Enforcement Officer Bill of Rights (POBR) statutes across 
the country to create special privacy rights for themselves and sometimes 
other unionized law enforcement officers.141 These privacy protections go 
beyond personal information, like residential addresses and social secu-
rity numbers, to include confidentiality clauses, heightened subpoena 
standards, and sealing and expungement clauses for police disciplinary 
records.142 
 
 138 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978). 
 139 See e.g., Obiajulu v. City of Rochester, 213 A.D.2d 1055, 1056 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); 
Faulkner v. Del Giacco, 139 Misc.2d 790, 794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988); Farrell v. Village Board 
of Trustees, 83 Misc. 2d 125 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). 
 140 See, e.g., Steve Reilly, How to Look up the Background of Teachers in Every State, 
USA TODAY, https://perma.cc/755U-HJU2 (last updated Mar. 4, 2016, 3:42 PM); James Kelly, 
New York Courts Put Attorney Discipline Records Online, N.Y. L. INST. (Feb. 24, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/8JR9-B3RC; Physician and Physician Assistants Disciplinary and Other Ac-
tions, N.Y.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://perma.cc/RN6C-33GP (last visited Jan. 8, 2019); En-
forcement Actions, N.Y.S. EDUC. DEP’T, https://perma.cc/L4VT-SL6H (last visited Jan. 8, 
2019). 
 141 Bies, supra note 128, at 125 (“In the 1970s, police unions also lobbied to support the 
development of the Police Officer Bill of Rights (POBR). Fourteen states have passed statu-
tory POBRs. The first states were Florida and Maryland in 1974, followed by [New York,] 
California and Rhode Island in 1976, Virginia in 1978, and Wisconsin in 1979.”). In addition 
to state statutory POBRs, police unions also embedded these “rights” into police union con-
tracts. Levine, supra note 7; see Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 
1198 (2017); Radley Balko, The Police Officers’ Bill of Rights, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/M94P-BAUC (providing an overview of the history, scope and consequences 
POBR provisions play in preventing accountability, including criminal investigations); Reade 
Levinson, Across the U.S., Police Contracts Shield Officers from Scrutiny and Discipline, 
REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2017, 1:18 PM), https://perma.cc/VNR5-K2X2 (reviewing 82 police union 
contracts and how their provisions related to discipline prevent accountability); Jon Swaine & 
George Joseph, Hackers Post Private Files of America’s Biggest Police Union, GUARDIAN 
(Jan. 28, 2016, 8:43 PM), https://perma.cc/G68J-B2ZT (“Hundreds of contracts between re-
gional authorities and local fraternal order of police lodges across the country were posted 
online as part of the hack. Some such deals have been sharply criticised [sic] as shielding 
police officers from prosecution or disciplinary action following the excessive use of force.”). 
 142 See Luongo v. Records Access Appeals Officer, 2019 WL 237463, at *1 (Jan. 17, 
2019). Compare Levine, supra note 7, at 33 (discussing West Virginia law protecting personal 
information if its release would result in an invasion of privacy), with N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW 
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One of these laws is New York State’s Civil Rights Law section 50-
a, enacted to protect officers testifying in court from “fishing expeditions” 
by defense attorneys.143 The Court of Appeals in New York State recently 
broadly interpreted section 50-a to imply that disclosure of NYPD admin-
istrative decisions and other “quintessential” personnel records is limited 
only to the litigation context rather than acting as an exemption to open 
records laws, untethering 50-a privacy protections from historical limita-
tions of broaden open government principles.144 The City has also cited 
section 50-a as the reason why any identifying information about the of-
ficers who killed Saheed Vassell cannot be disclosed.145 Neither the deci-
sion nor the City’s justifications cited consideration of competing First 
Amendment constitutional principles about the right to access infor-
mation. 
Laws that hide police disciplinary records embody the “abstract in-
cantation” of privacy we should be skeptical of.146 It creates police-only 
privacy, where otherwise no privacy right is recognized by constitutional 
or state law, for the purposes of undoing the public’s expectation of access 
to information about government misconduct. Additionally, these laws 
also shield from the public an entire class of criminal acts that, if done by 
anyone else, would be publicly accessible through the criminal process. 
To understand with more granularity what specific types of privacy harms 
police are claiming to support these laws, the next section will analyze 
police union rhetoric using more specific vocabulary. 
B. Naming Privacy Harms Relevant to Police Disciplinary 
Information 
In Daniel J. Solove’s Taxonomy of Privacy, a paper presented to the 
International Association of Privacy Professionals, Solove identifies four 
categories of privacy harms: (1) information collection, (2) information 
processing (storage, manipulation and use), (3) dissemination of infor-
mation, and (4) invasions into private affairs.147 Some of the privacy 
 
§ 50-a (McKinney 2018) (categorically covering all information stemming out of anything in 
personnel records regardless of whether it would be an invasion of privacy or is in the public 
interest). 
 143 For a legislative history of section 50-a, see Conti-Cook, Defending the Public, supra 
note 118, at 1070 and Levine, supra note 7. 
 144 NYCLU v. NYPD, 2018 WL 6492733, at *9 (N.Y. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018). 
 145 Rajvi Desai, Crown Heights Shooting Victim Saheed Vassell’s Family Demands NYPD 
Release All Videos, Officers’ Names, AM N.Y., https://perma.cc/S5Q8-ZCDK (last updated 
Apr. 12, 2018, 6:34 PM). 
 146 See Solove, supra note 131, at 477-78. 
 147 Solove, supra note 131, at 488. 
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harms (surveillance, social media, corporate data entities) are not appli-
cable to balancing privacy concerns related to police discipline because 
the concerns do not relate to the collection of new data or its storage, for 
example.148 Rather, any privacy harms at stake in making police discipli-
nary information accessible all fall under one category: dissemination of 
information, or how information that has already been collected and is 
being stored is shared or distributed publicly. Under that broader cate-
gory, the types of privacy harms claimed by policy, according to Solove’s 
labels, include disclosure, distortion, and increased accessibility. The fol-
lowing sections ask whether, according to these labels, police have strong 
claims to privacy harms. 
1. Disclosure 
Disclosure, or the “protections against disclosures of true infor-
mation about people” is one privacy concern that police claim.149 The tort 
of public disclosure of private facts “creates a cause of action for one who 
publicly discloses a private matter that is ‘highly offensive to a reasonable 
person’ and ‘is not of legitimate concern to the public.’”150 Courts have 
held that events are not private if they are “left open to the public eye,” 
let alone committed by an on-duty public official.151 Facts are also not 
private when they are facts about official government functions, which 
bends the balance in favor of transparency because it concerns official 
functions that the public should be informed about in order to make edu-
cated decisions about reform. 
This leads to the second part of the inquiry. Would a reasonable per-
son be highly offended by the disclosure of police misconduct infor-
mation? Other public officials and licensed professionals, as described 
above, have disciplinary information that is publicly available. In many 
instances their misconduct is searchable online.152 Police often claim that 
official findings of misconduct are not evidence that the misconduct oc-
 
 148 See id. at 491 (“Information collection creates disruption based on the process of data 
gathering. Even if no information is revealed publicly, information collection can create harm. 
I will identify two forms of information collection: (1) surveillance and (2) interrogation.”)); 
id. at 505 (“[P]rocessing diverges from dissemination because the data transfer does not in-
volve the disclosure of the information to the public–or even to another person. Rather, data 
is often transferred between various record systems and consolidated with other data.”). 
 149 Id. at 527. 
 150 Id. at 527-28 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977)). 
 151 Id. at 531 (quoting Penwell v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1984)) (holding that a couple wrongfully arrested in public “open to the public eye” had 
no privacy interest against the broadcast of video footage of the arrest). 
 152 See sources cited, supra note 140. 
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curred because they generally do not agree with substantiated investiga-
tions of misconduct. Patrick Lynch, president of New York’s Patrolmen’s 
Benevolent Association, for example, has repeatedly publicly attacked the 
findings of the Civilian Complaint Review Board: “The CCRB has al-
ways been infected with an anti-police bias, and has never lived up to its 
responsibility under the city charter to conduct ‘complete, thorough and 
impartial’ investigations of civilian complaints ‘in a manner in which the 
public and police department have confidence.’”153 Regardless of police 
union representatives’ claims to privacy, even for on-duty official mis-
conduct substantiated by independent investigations, courts have never 
extended any reasonable expectation of privacy so far.154 
Third, police misconduct information is obviously a matter of public 
concern, as discussed above in Part I.155 Police often argue it is not. Sup-
porters of secrecy argue that the public lacks a general understanding 
about the disciplinary system and will not be able to make informed de-
cisions based on misconduct without more context.156 Responding to a 
similar argument by the NYPD that disclosures should not be made be-
cause it was in the public’s best interest to withhold information they 
could not digest, Judge Jenny Rivera wrote in dissent: 
It would turn FOIL on its head to apply it as a means by which 
government may withhold information based on some amorphous 
concept of what the general public understands. It is not for gov-
ernment to decide what the public makes of the information dis-
closed. Indeed, the NYPD’s implicit suggestion—that the public 
is better served by withholding information it cannot under-
stand—ignores the legislative declaration that “government is the 
public’s business.”157 
As discussed in Part I, withholding information about police miscon-
duct, out of a belief the public cannot understand harms public confidence 
in justice and disciplinary systems, and public discourse and is not a rea-
son to hide misconduct but to the contrary, a reason to produce it. 
 
 153 Josh Russell, NYC Cops Push Back on Civilians’ Sex-Misconduct Oversight, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS (Mar. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/UD6D-9259 (quoting Patrick J. Lynch, 
President of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of New York City). 
 154 See sources cited, supra note 132. 
 155 See, supra Section I.B., for a discussion of the role of for transparency in public per-
ception of and participation in justice systems. 
 156 See Levine, supra note 7. 
 157 NYCLU v. NYPD, No. 133, 2018 WL 6492733, at *14 (N.Y. Dec. 11, 2018) (Rivera, 
J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
2019] A NEW BALANCE 183 
Accessibility of police misconduct information, at least for on-duty 
misconduct, does not create a disclosure harm under this definition be-
cause it is not about a private matter, disclosure should not offend a rea-
sonable person, and the information is squarely of public concern. 
2. Distortion 
“Distortion is the manipulation of the way a person is perceived and 
judged by others, and involves the victim being inaccurately exposed to 
the public.”158 It is different from disclosure, under Solove’s definition, 
because “with distortion, the information revealed is false and mislead-
ing.”159 The harm is an undeserved blemish on an individual’s reputation. 
This concern captures the bulk of concerns identified by officers, who 
usually claim privacy rights while simultaneously identifying all allega-
tions against them as false, retaliatory, or out of context, regardless of the 
evidence to the contrary.160 Again, Pat Lynch’s statements against the 
CCRB beat this drum routinely: “Our problem with the CCRB has always 
been first, their predisposition that police officers are always wrong. Sec-
ond, their inexperienced investigators who conduct faulty investigations 
that arrive at improper conclusions and now those wrong conclusions will 
now be prosecuted at these kangaroo trials.”161 All information coming 
out of the “kangaroo trials” in the NYPD disciplinary system, according 
to Lynch, is tainted and unreliable, making all publicity about it inherently 
 
 158 Solove, supra note 131, at 547. 
 159 Id. 
 160 See Levine, supra note 7; Justin Fenton, Baltimore Police Disciplinary Records Re-
main Shielded Despite Revelations of Misconduct, BALT. SUN (Feb. 17, 2018, 8:55 AM), 
https://perma.cc/P7FY-6L7Z (“Law enforcement officials say making police personnel and 
disciplinary records public would invade the privacy of officers and their families, and subject 
them to airing of allegations that turned out to be baseless . . . . Kruger said opening up records 
would ‘provide fodder for plaintiffs’ attorneys,’ ‘invites a micro-examination and second-
guessing of investigations . . . by non-professionals,’ and create ‘intrusive opportunities to 
challenge a chief or sheriff’s decision-making process.’”); Levinson, supra note 141 (“Jason 
Pappas, president of the Columbus Fraternal Order of Police, said the union contract [shielding 
disciplinary records] does not skew investigations or limit accountability. ‘If every officer 
started getting disciplined or moved because somebody started filing complaints, hell, the 
whole neighborhood would start filing complaints,’ he said.”); Russell, supra note 154 (“‘The 
CCRB has always been infected with an anti-police bias, and has never lived up to its respon-
sibility under the city charter to conduct “complete, thorough and impartial” investigations of 
civilian complaints “in a manner in which the public and police department have confidence,”‘ 
PBA President Lynch said.”). 
 161 Bob Hennelly, Complaints Against Cops to Be Tried by CCRB, Not NYPD, WNYC 
NEWS (Mar. 27, 2012), https://perma.cc/F6Q9-8MUH (quoting Patrick J. Lynch, President of 
the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of New York City). 
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likely to distort the reputation of officers.162 Sowing this kind of funda-
mental doubt in a system the public cannot access meaningfully allows 
these claims of distortion to resonate unchecked. Certainly we cannot cat-
egorically agree that public access to all police misconduct will result in 
“false and misleading” information about individual acts of misconduct 
being revealed. Indeed, the corruption, favoritism, and overly broad dis-
cretion creating unfairness in the police disciplinary system that Lynch 
opposes may be the result of secrecy, not a reason to push for more of it. 
Police rhetoric usually does not center on individual distortion 
harms, however; the harms police amplify are a collective kind of distor-
tion.163 Testifying against a transparency bill, Karen Kruger, general 
counsel for the Maryland Chiefs of Police, claimed that releasing infor-
mation about police disciplinary records would “undermine community 
confidence in the law enforcement agency in its entirety.”164 The PBA 
also claims this collective harm. Responding to an announcement by the 
CCRB that reported a higher complaint substantiation rate in 2015, the 
PBA warned: “[CCRB is] part of a political apparatus that has been sys-
tematically denigrating the reputation of a fine police department and its 
officers and that must stop.”165 Police even extend this argument of harm 
to the community, arguing the community’s confidence in officers will be 
harmed if individual officers’ misconduct is publicized. California police 
made similar arguments when testifying against transparency measures in 
2008. 
The mandated disclosure of officer’s personnel records called for 
in this bill will subject officers to increased risk of retribution on 
the streets, lost credibility, diminished effectiveness on the beat, 
diminished credibility on the witness stand, increased civil liabil-
ity, and general embarrassment. Maintaining the confidentiality 
of these records best serves the important policy goal of maintain-
ing confidence in law enforcement by avoiding premature disclo-
sure of groundless claims of police misconduct.166 
When distortion harms claimed are no longer about preventing dis-
closure of false and misleading information about an individual, but about 
 
 162 This strategy is typical of government officials accused of misconduct, Charles I also 
“turned every exchange into an opportunity to insult the court.” ROBERTSON, supra note 43, 
at 171. 
 163 Levine, supra note 7, at 45. 
 164 Fenton, supra note 161 (quoting Karen Kruger, General Counsel for the Maryland 
Chiefs of Police). 
 165 Fractenberg, supra note 128. 
 166 Peace Officer Records: Hearing on S.B. 1019 Before the S. Comm. Pub. Safety, 2007-
2008 Sess., (Cal. 2008). 
2019] A NEW BALANCE 185 
isolating a government entity from community criticism, they are no 
longer about protecting privacy, but about preserving the power of ano-
nymity. This concern should not justify withholding police disciplinary 
information. More transparency around police misconduct information 
may actually improve the collective reputation of the majority of officers 
who do not accumulate misconduct records. More access to information 
about charges, penalties, and filings related to proceedings and increased 
public discourse could give the public the context it needs to understand 
the significance of minor charges. Such pressure could result not only in 
more swift and certain accountability for officers who committed miscon-
duct but more fairness and equity for officers unjustly accused by abusive 
supervisors. 
A more reasonable concern about potential harm from “airing of al-
legations that turned out to be baseless”167 should be considered sepa-
rately from this collective claim to harm. It is more reasonable because it 
implicitly discerns public value in some allegations rather than broadly 
painting all allegations as baseless. Thus far police unions have muddied 
this debate with general protections about all disciplinary information de-
spite the outcome of an investigation or prosecution. In states that block 
access to records the public is deprived of enough information to partici-
pate in such a debate and often deemed “incompetent” to even engage in 
such a debate based on its lack of context.168 Certainly a “thoughtful pub-
lication regime” should be debated by all stakeholders, including mem-
bers of the public who have been through the process of filing complaints, 
and participating in investigations and prosecutions, but they must have 
the same access to information.169 Thus far, the regime has been dictated 
by the police unions rather than deliberated through discourse. 
A real debate may consider, for example, whether allegations exon-
erated by an investigation do not need to be publicly available. Of course 
releasing the outcome of the allegations with the findings may mitigate 
any resulting distortion harm. On the other end, allegations substantiated 
by investigations (falling more squarely under the “disclosure” analysis 
above) should perhaps always be available.170 District Court Judge Wein-
stein even found that allegations deemed inconclusive (or “unsubstanti-
ated”) could lead to discoverable evidence for a civil rights plaintiff and 
 
 167 Fenton, supra note 161. 
 168 Levine, supra note 7 (“[The] institutional competence of the public [is] to read such 
records . . . .”). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Some officers would disagree due to their skepticism of CCRB’s investigations. See, 
e.g., Hennelly, supra note 162 (“PBA President Patrick J. Lynch, an outspoken critic of the 
CCRB, was sharply critical of [CCRB’s] new powers [to prosecute officers in administrative 
trials].”). 
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a similar argument could be made in favor of making inconclusive out-
comes available to public as well.171 
Acknowledging that some distortion harms may result from publica-
tion of exonerated allegations is not the same thing as acknowledging that 
police have the same constitutional rights as people accused of crimes.172 
Equating advocacy around sealing of criminal convictions to the claims 
of police privacy in disciplinary records is a pathos appeal to advocates 
for people accused of crimes that relies on a false equivalency.173 Private 
citizens should be able to have greater expectations of privacy in their 
misconduct than officers deputized by the state with a gun and badge. 
When police officers walk into courtrooms in uniform, their uniform rep-
resents unspoken trust that the state has confirmed in their credibility and 
reliability. Jurors assume if they are trustworthy enough to carry a gun 
and a badge then their testimony must also be trustworthy. Many other 
public employees with uniforms, licenses, or other credentials do expect 
their disciplinary information to be available publicly despite their simi-
larly situated vulnerability in public proceedings and in the media. Private 
citizens are not operating daily with the same state-sanctioned voucher 
and should expect greater privacy in their own non-criminal misdeeds yet 
would still, if called to testify against someone in a criminal proceeding, 
be subject to impeachment based on any prior bad acts the court considers 
material and relevant.174 
In addition to investigation outcomes needing debate, there are some 
types of misconduct the public is more concerned about than others. Cal-
ifornia recently modified their police privacy laws to allow public access 
to specific categories of information: uses of force, sexual assault, and 
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false statements.175 All allegations of force are now publicly available, 
along with allegations of sexual assault, and false statements that have 
been substantiated through an investigation. Before committing to a pre-
scribed set of types of misconduct the public should access, the public 
should demand more information about the types of charges routinely 
brought. Some charges may be obviously in the public interest, such as 
all charges that overlap with crimes like assault, sexual assault, and per-
jury. Other types of charges may also be in the public interest, for exam-
ple, manipulating crime reports to change statistics.176 Types of charges 
probably not in the public interest might be that an officer is accused of 
dating someone with a felony record.177 
Police privacy advocates’ concerns about distortion harms are not 
comparable to the concerns of people convicted of crimes and, inversely, 
advocates could not invoke police advocates’ arguments without their 
lobbying and political power (including the leverage that comes from 
staffing elected officials’ security detail, knowing their schedules and 
having resources to protest them around the clock). Fear of unfounded 
allegations, retaliatory complaints, scandalous media, and accusations 
taken out of context are fears held equally by all who are arrested, charged 
in open court, and prosecuted. The same goes for anyone called to testify 
in court, whether in the course of their employment with the state or city, 
or civilians called to testify as witnesses. Yet none, with the exception of 
minors, can claim successfully that records related to their arrest and pros-
ecution should be made inaccessible, at least until their case has been dis-
missed. To the extent many of those issues persist for people with convic-
tion histories, the answer is not only to seal more convictions, but to 
collect information about the problems in the system, like police miscon-
duct, and work towards solutions that prevent false arrests and other 
abuses in the first place.178 
3. Increased Accessibility 
Another possible privacy harm that police claim is increased acces-
sibility. Solove defines increased accessibility as taking, for example, 
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 177 See id. 
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documents that are already publicly accessible, and collecting them in 
online databases, making them easier to access.179 Police consider this a 
harm because they believe they are more visible than other public officials 
due to their daily interactions with the public, usually in easily identifiable 
uniform or vehicles.180 Police worry that increased accessibility will lead 
to everything from less initiative amongst officers in making arrests to 
attacks on specific officers.181 But whether these concerns will come to 
pass is an empirical question and, as more jurisdictions adopt transpar-
ency measures for police disciplinary records without such harms arising, 
it is becoming increasingly clear that the answer to the empirical question 
is no. 
Arguments about the potential harm of increased accessibility to po-
lice disciplinary records were made recently in Chicago, where the 
founder of Invisible Institute, Jamie Kalven, won his petition against the 
City of Chicago “seeking two types of documents: (1) lists of Chicago 
police officers who amassed the most misconduct complaints (referred to 
as Repeater Lists or RLs); and (2) complaint register files (referred to as 
CRs) related to CPD’s completed investigations into allegations of police 
misconduct.”182 That decision affirmed that the purpose of Freedom of 
Information laws is “to open governmental records to the light of public 
scrutiny.”183 The impact of this decision on public discourse around CPD 
secrecy cannot be overstated: 
For decades, the city of Chicago, the police department, and the 
police unions argued that various horrible consequences would 
ensue if officer names were made public – officers would be tar-
geted, their families harassed, the security of police operations 
undermined, etc.184 
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Despite the alarmist cries over these concerns, their fears have not mate-
rialized. 
Although Kalven faced backlash from the Fraternal Order of Police, 
he founded the Invisible Institute to “under[take] the task of operational-
izing transparency” after winning access to decades of complaint register 
files.185 Kalven and “a team of programmers, designers and data scien-
tists” then took up the challenge of making police disciplinary records 
accessible and usable by the public.186 The result is a public database 
online called the Citizens’ Police Data Project (CPDP).187 The database 
allows users to not only analyze one officer’s history of misconduct, but 
patterns of misconduct geographically, across a group of officers, and 
across a type of misconduct. One can analyze not only the misconduct 
allegations but also the department’s accountability in response: 
 “Beyond its utility to particular sets of users, CPDP served as a 
biopsy of the system, a statistical portrait of impunity, and a 
demonstration of how the Chicago Police Department goes about 
not connecting the dots about patterns of human rights abuse they 
have the means to identify.”188 
The Fraternal Order of Police immediately moved to block the dis-
closure, claiming that it was a violation of their contract with the city.189 
CPDP came online in 2015 with a limited dataset. None of the parade of 
horribles promised by the police prior to the release of this information 
transpired: “In the three years since we made the first limited release of 
police disciplinary information, nothing of that nature has been re-
ported.”190 The actual result in Chicago was an indictment of a system 
which failed to address complaints of police misconduct.191 Once again, 
the balance tips towards transparency. 
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Through this analysis of disclosure, distortion, and increased acces-
sibility, the only privacy harm that supports some careful deliberation 
about public access is potential distortion of individuals whose allegations 
are repudiated by an investigation. Distortion of the collective reputation 
of officers should be rejected as a basis for hiding police disciplinary rec-
ords from public access. This does not mean that during the public debate 
about charges, processes, or penalties, the public should not discern the 
significance of a fraction of officers’ misconduct in relation to the remain-
ing members of the department. They absolutely should. But that debate 
must happen with all participants having equal access to the information 
their points and counterpoints rely on. Disclosure and increased accessi-
bility are not privacy harms that favor hiding police disciplinary records. 
Police concerns of professional privacy are not equivalent to the pri-
vacy concerns of people who are not weaponized by the government and 
entrusted to act on behalf of the public’s interest. Police cannot have the 
option of wearing a mask to hide their identity or claim a “right to be 
forgotten,” as some private citizens may.192 Police and civilian concerns 
are also not equivalent when government access and technology allow for 
far greater levels of surveillance, interrogation, aggregation, identifica-
tion, exclusion, disclosure, and distortion of the public, than public access 
to police officers.193 
CONCLUSION 
On one side of the scale, we have the harms of hiding police miscon-
duct; including trauma, distrust in justice systems, and a limited public 
discourse around police accountability.194 Mothers and fathers who have 
 
 192 For more information on the “right to be forgotten,” see GDPR: Right to Be Forgotten, 
INTERSOFT CONSULTING, https://perma.cc/4RUR-K55J (lasted visited Jan. 3, 2019) (describ-
ing that the “right to be forgotten” established in the 2014 . . . requiring the erasure of personal 
data where no longer needed or where consent is withdrawn). 
 193 See Solove, supra note 131, at 497, 501; Kristen V. Brown, Report: Police Forced a 
DNA Testing Company to Share a Customer’s Identity in the Golden State Killer Case, 
GIZMODO (May 1, 2018, 1:55 PM), https://perma.cc/62DR-TRK6; Samantha Schmidt, This 
Site Will Remove Your Mug Shot – for a Price, Authorities Say. Its Owners are Charged with 
Extortion., WASH. POST (May 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/DY7L-KEWY; Tom Simonite, Few 
Rules Govern Police Use of Facial-Recognition Technology, WIRED (May 22, 2018, 9:35 
PM), https://perma.cc/P9UK-LB8W; A Guide To Law Enforcement Spying Technology, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://perma.cc/JTE2-D7FE (last visited Jan. 8, 2019); Japan 
Tapping Gait Recognition Tech in Criminal Probes, JAPAN TIMES (May 8, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/WE46-YRBV. 
 194 See Claire Bushey, Chicago Police Misconduct Records Published Online, CRAIN’S 
CHI. BUS. (Nov. 10, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/MWJ7-6ST7 (“For basically the entire 
history of the city, citizens who had issues with police misconduct had no information about 
whether officers that they had problems with were accused of similar mistreatment of oth-
ers . . . . It was literally a black box, and that created a problem.”). 
2019] A NEW BALANCE 191 
lost their children to police killings have the right to seek the truth about 
their children’s last moments and a better understanding of why they were 
killed, as well as the depth of fault they can assign to the state. Their com-
munities deserve to feel safe knowing that anonymous, faceless officers 
are not riding around their neighborhood abusing the power of their pri-
vacy. “Nothing can be changed until it is faced” and no one without a face 
can be changed if given the troublesome twin power of state-sanctioned 
violence and anonymity.195 Such an asymmetrical system does not culti-
vate public trust, no matter how many assurances of fairness and func-
tionality a politician makes. “Justice must be seen to be done” so that it 
can be witnessed, probed, debated, and even if the outcome is disagreea-
ble, the path of the decision-maker is apparent. Without having access to 
police misconduct information, the public speculates on scraps of anec-
dotes leaked, rumored, and unstudied, while corruption, incompetence, 
and prejudice breed unabated. The final harm is to us all. We cannot en-
gage in an educated way in debates with police union officials or police 
department officials about what is happening in the police disciplinary 
system. Public discourse is stunted and government is deprived of many 
potential creative solutions members of the public could contribute. De-
liberative democracy in an open society encourages critical debate. Rather 
than disparaging the public as incompetent in understanding complex sys-
tems, give them the information that will allow them to make an educated 
decision about how to improve the functionality of their local police dis-
ciplinary system. 
On the other side of the scale are police privacy harms. Not the 
bloated amorphous specter of privacy, but fairly discrete harms of disclo-
sure, distortion, and increased accessibility. The most legitimate of these 
concerns is about distortion. Whether exonerated complaints should ever 
be public, for example, deserves deeper informed discussion with stake-
holders, including the public and police, about what standards of substan-
tiation serve the public interest more than obscure it. This decision de-
pends primarily on the public’s confidence in exonerations to truly reflect 
thorough and fair investigations that weigh, and not dismiss, complaints 
of misconduct. The remaining privacy harms of disclosure, distortion of 
police generally, and increased accessibility, not only fail to weigh heav-
ily against public access, they weigh in favor of transparency. These 
feared harms call for more openness, not less. 
The alternative to a more transparent system is to retreat to a closed 
system of state secrets where we are divided in the dark. The blackout is 
where we currently reside. Families in New York City, like Saheed 
 
 195 In some states police have literally sought anonymity by prohibiting disclosure of po-
lice department rosters. See, e.g., H.B. 378, 149th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Del. 2018). 
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Vassell’s, Ramarley Graham’s, Shantal Davis’s, Mohammad Bah’s, Sean 
Bell’s, Eric Garner’s, Akai Gurley’s, Delrawn Small’s, and many more, 
continue to fight for equal access to information about all participants in 
violent police encounters to balance a currently distorted public narrative. 
Following each of these violent deaths and the aggressive police media 
campaigns relying heavily on releasing sealed arrest records of the people 
killed by police, it is clear why police fear public disclosure of discipli-
nary information. They fear the public will weaponize it the same way 
police have. While it may be reasonable for police to fear the public will 
use prior misconduct the way that police have used similar information 
about people killed by police, the power dynamics of our current “justice” 
system will never leave them as vulnerable to the people as the people are 
to them. 
